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The Phenomenology of Choice
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Throughout  our  lives  we  have  to  make  choices.  After  college  we
choose where and what to study.1 In a restaurant we choose what we
want  for  dinner.  When we  plan  our  holidays  we  choose  between
different alternatives. In some cases we need to choose the morally
right thing to do. In other cases we need to choose whether we favour
our self-interest over the interests of others. While some choices –
like choosing the starter of one's dinner in a restaurant – are unlikely
to have a big impact on one's life, others – like what and where to
study  after  college  –  have  an  immense  one.  Sometimes  different
choices can lead us through different paths to the same place, other
choices  can lead us to completely  different  places.  Ultimately,  the
person we become depends on our choices.
Thus, it  is not surprising that thinking about one's current and past
choices plays an important role in our lives. In many situations we try
to discover which alternative is the best one. At some times we have
plenty of time to analyse the different options, at other times we have
to take a quick decision.  It  is  also not uncommon to wonder what
would have happened if  we had made a different  choice at  some
point in our lives.  
1 This and the following choices are just for illustrative purpose. The 'we'
does not necessarily apply to the reader. 
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A more academic question is  whether  we are free in  our  choices.
While some defend the view that a person is free or acts out of her
own free will when she has an alternative to act otherwise2, others
defend  the  view  that  acting  out  of  free  will  consists  in  acting  in
accordance  with  one's  will3.  The  question  of  free  will  is  also  an
important topic because of its link to moral responsibility. A common
view  is  to  consider  free  will  a  necessary  condition  for  moral
responsibility. Only if an agent could have acted otherwise, she can
be  blamed  or  praised  for  her  actions.  But,  as  noted  above,  the
definition of free will, as being able to act otherwise, is controversial.
And  the  question  whether  being  able  to  act  otherwise  really  is  a
condition  for  moral  responsibility  is  no less  controversial4.  For  this
reason, I have chosen to avoid using the notion of free will  in this
work and also to leave questions of moral responsibility aside. I focus
solely on the topic of choice and alternatives. One of my goals in this
work is to get a better understanding of what an alternative is and to
make distinctions between different kinds of alternatives and different
senses  of  'can'  which  we  attribute  to  agents.  I  argue  that  the
difference between the kinds of alternatives and senses of 'can' are
rooted in our phenomenal experience of choice. 
A central  goal  of  the  present  work  is  to  tackle  the  compatibility
question. Traditionally, the question is whether free will is compatible
with the truth of the thesis of determinism. That is,  the question is
2 E.g. Descartes (1641/1984) in Meditation IV: “the ability to do or not do
something” as cited in O'Connor (2014).
3 E.g. Hobbes (1668/1997), p. 108: a person's freedom consists in finding
“no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]”
as cited in McKenna & Coates (2015).
4 Cf. Frankfurt (1969), Fischer (1994).
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whether we can have free will if determinism were true. Setting aside
the  notion  of  free  will,  I  investigate  whether  the  choices,  as  we
experience them in our agentive phenomenology, are compatible with
the truth of determinism. In order to do so, I raise the question of how
the world has to be such that an agent really has the alternatives she
experiences to have. 
The  present  work  is  embedded  in  the  current  research  on  the
phenomenology of agency which has gained in popularity in the last
few years5. At the centre of this approach is the idea that in order to
get  a  better  understanding  of  human  agency  and  the  related
concepts, we need to closely pay attention to our phenomenology.
What this approach tries to discover are not some contingent traits of
agentive phenomenology, but the essential traits commonly found in
all rational human agents. Those traits are taken to be entrenched in
the human nature. 
In  the  present  work,  I  argue  that  a  deeply  entrenched  feature  of
agentive phenomenology of  rational  human agents is  incompatible
with the truth of determinism. That is, this experience would turn out
to be systematically illusory if determinism were true. I take this result
to  provide  a  (partial)  explanation  of  why  libertarianism,  i.e.  the
position that free will  is incompatible with determinism and that we
have free will, represents for many who encounter the free will debate
for the first time the most intuitive position6, although libertarianism is
5 Most notably Wakefield & Dreyfus (1991), Horgan et al. (2003), Wegner
(2002).  An  extensive  overview  of  the  different  debates  in  the
phenomenology of agency can be found in Bayne (2008).
6 This  claim has  been contended by  philosophers  who investigate  this
question by “testing folk intuitions” in so-called experimental philosophy,
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metaphysically more demanding than compatibilism7. In other words,
I suggest that libertarianism seems plausible to many who encounter
the  question  of  free  will  for  the  first  time  because  the  position  is
strongly linked to our phenomenology of agency. 
1.2 Overview
I start by presenting my principal argument and proceed by clarifying
and refining my account. After the introduction in the first chapter, I
present  my  argument  in  the  second  chapter,  which  I  call  “my
incompatibility argument”.  The argument attempts to show that  our
experiences of choice would – under the assumption of nomological
determinism – turn out  to  be systematically illusory.  The argument
relies on the analysis of the experience of alternatives as open and
up  to  the  agent  –  I  call  them  OU alternatives.  The  third  chapter
addresses  the  question  of  how  common  experiences  of  OU
alternatives  are  and  continues  with  the  question  of  how to  count
see  Nahmias  et  al.  (2004).  For  a  view  with  alternative  experimental
findings see Nichols (2004). In the present work, I do not address the
findings and methodology of experimental philosophy. 
7 Compatibilism,  as  the  thesis  that  free  will  and  determinism  are
compatible,  does  not  require  the  truth  or  falsity  of  (the  thesis  of)
determinism  in  order  for  an  agent  to  have  free  will  and  is  thus
metaphysically  less  demanding.  Some compatibilists  do  however  not
only  argue  that  free  will  and  compatibilism  are  compatible  but  they
defend  the  position  that  free will  requires  the  truth  (of  the  thesis)  of
determinism, in that case the theory becomes similarly demanding.
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experienced alternatives. The chapter continues with a fundamental
worry raised by Terence Horgan on the limits of introspection. Horgan
defends  the  view  that  we  are  in  fact  tempted  to  answer  the
compatibility  question  negatively,  but  that  we  should  resist  this
temptation because we are likely to commit several types of mistakes
in  our  analysis.  Following  the  discussion  of  Horgan's  position,  I
address  a  challenge  raised  by  Richard  Holton  on  the  distinction
between  local  and  global  claims  of  compatibility.  The  chapter
continues with the question whether the central phenomenon really is
an experience of OU alternatives or whether we merely have beliefs
about our alternatives being open and up to us. I then address the
question whether the experience of OU alternatives is a perceptual
experience. The chapter then continues with a fallback position for my
incompatibility argument which does not rely on agentive experiences
and ends with a sketch of an argument against compatibilism which
relies solely on beliefs. 
In the fourth chapter, I discuss four cases which allow me to clarify
some important points about my analysis of OU alternatives. The fifth
chapter  discusses  an  argument  presented  by  John  Martin  Fischer
which he calls the basic version of the argument for incompatibilism.
The discussion of Fischer's argument allows me to further elaborate
my position on alternatives and can-claims. While Fischer identifies
can-claims with what I call OU alternatives, I argue that we need to
distinguish  between  two  types  of  can-claims.  The  discussion  of
Fischer's argument continues in chapter six where the focus is placed
on deliberation. I attempt to show that Fischer needs to accept some
peculiarities  which  I  can  avoid  thanks  to  the  above  distinction
between can-claims. In the second half of the chapter, I address the
question  of  compatibility  between  deliberation  and  the  thesis  of
determinism.  I  discuss  Derk  Pereboom's  deliberation-compatibilism
11
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and argue that it is not in conflict with my argument. I also reject an
objection  based  on  David  J.  Velleman's  epistemic  account  of
freedom. 
The  seventh  chapter  discusses  Newcomb's  problem.  I  present
Fischer's  solution  and  highlight  the  advantage  of  accepting  my
position.  Further,  the  chapter  discusses  a  variant  of  Newcomb's
problem with an infallible predictor. This variant permits to formulate a
challenge  for  Pereboom's  epistemic  account  based  on  the
combination  of  Peter  Van  Inwagen's  Two  Door  scenario  with
Newcomb's infallible predictor. I finish the chapter by defending the
view that  a Newcomb's problem with an infallible predictor  has no
solution. In the final chapter, I present a recapitulation of the present
work.
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2 My incompatibility argument
2.1 Overview
In this chapter, I present my incompatibility argument in eight steps.
The  first  step  (1)  is  the  description  of  the  phenomenology  of  the
experience of choice. I argue that in such an experience, at least two
alternatives are presented as open and up to the agent.  (2) is the
premise that the experience has a content which can be assessed for
its veridicality. The third premise (3) states that an alternative is open
and up to the agent if there exists an extension in the future, of the
actual  situation  the  agent  is  in,  in  which  the  agent  realizes  the
alternative.  Based  on  premises  (2)  and  (3)  we  obtain  (4)  the
veridicality  condition  of  an  experience  of  choice.  For  every
experienced  OU  alternative  there  must  exist  an  extension  of  the
current situation such that the alternative is realized in the extension.
(5) is the premise that OU alternatives are mutually exclusive, that is,
only  one  of  them  can  be  realized.  (6)  is  the  assumption  of
nomological  determinism.  Based  on  the  definition  of  nomological
determinism we obtain (7) that there exists only one extension in the
future. Based on (1), (4), (5) and (7) we obtain the conclusion that
under the assumption of nomological determinism all experiences of
choice are systematically illusory.
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2.2 The argument
(1) In an experience of choice, at least two open-and-up-to-the-
agent alternatives (OU alternatives) are presented to the agent8
in her experience, i.e. two alternatives are presented to the agent
in her experience to be open and up to her.
The motivation for this premise is phenomenological. I argue that in
an experience of choice at least two alternatives seem to the agent to
be such that they are open to her and it is up to her which of these
alternatives  she realizes.  If  only  one alternative  is  experienced as
open  and  up to  the agent,  then it  is  no longer  experienced as  a
choice. If, for instance, I am tied to a chair such that I cannot move, I
will not experience the situation to be a situation of choice because I
experience the situation to be such that no alternative is open and up
to me other than remaining seated.9 In a typical situation of choice, I
am confronted with at least two alternatives which both seem to be
such  that  I  can  choose  to  act  so  as  to  realize  one  of  them.  For
instance, if while hiking I come to a crossroads, it will seem to me that
8 My claim is intended to  describe the experience of  choice of  rational
human  agents.  This  does  obviously  not  exclude  the  possibility  that
irrational or non-human agents have the same type of experience.
9 Note that while it seems as if I have no choice about whether to stand up
or remain seated, it might still seem to me that I have a choice about my
breathing speed, about whether to keep my eyes open or closed, etc.
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I  can take either path.10 I  seem to be in a situation such that both
alternatives are actions I can realize next in the very situation I am in
at the moment of choice. 
Note  that  I  am  not  hereby  suggesting  that  agents  experience
counterfactual possibilities. For instance, while hiking, I might believe
that I could have stayed at home. This possibility is likely to be true,
as I could have decided not to go hiking in the morning but to remain
at home and read a book instead. But I am not claiming that this type
of possibility is the type of possibility phenomenally given in situations
of choice. I claim that the possibilities given in a situation of choice
are merely about possible actions I could do next in the very situation
of choice I am in at that moment. Taking the right or left path are thus
alternatives that I claim are given to the agent in her experience to be
open and up to her, but I do not make any claims about whether the
agent experiences the possibility of being at home instead of being on
a hike.
My claim is not about  an accidental feature of our experience,  but
about  an essential  feature. I  claim that  it  is  impossible to have an
experience of choice without being given in experience at least two
alternatives that seem to be open and up the agent. Neither should
my claim be confused with the claim that one cannot choose without
having an experience of choice. I am merely considering the cases
10 Other alternatives are given to me in this situation, too.  For instance,
stopping at the crossroads, walking back from where I was coming, or
leaving the paths and walk off-path. In my argument, I focus on two out
of these many alternatives, as my claim is that in a situation of choice at
least two alternatives are given to the agent.
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where an agent does have an experience of choice. 
(2)  An  experience  of  choice  is  veridical  if  and  only  if  all  the
presented  alternatives  are  open  and  up  to  the  agent.  An
experience is illusory if and only if one or more of the presented
alternatives fail to be open and up to the agent.
I presuppose that experiences of choice have a content, i.e. the world
seems to be a certain way. I further presuppose that the content can
be  assessed  for  accuracy.11 If  and  only  if  the  world  is  the  way  it
seems to be, the experience is veridical. And if and only if the world is
in conflict with the way the world is, the experience is illusory.12 
If I am standing at a place which looks to be a crossroads and it seem
to  me  that  I  can  either  take  the  left  or  the  right  path,  then  my
experience is veridical if and only if I really stand at a crossroads and
it  is  open  and  up  to  me to  take  either  the  left  or  the  right  path.
However, if the situation is such that only one option is open to me,
e.g. somebody has constructed an ingenious optical illusion such that
it  looks to me that I have two OU alternatives, but in fact there is
merely  a  white  wall  on  my right  onto  which  a  scenery  has  been
projected such that it looks as if there was also a path on the right but
11 For a defence of  this thesis see Horgan&Tienson (2002) and Siewert
(1998).
12 The content of an experience is in conflict with the way the world is, if the
proposition that is given to be true in the experience contradicts a true
proposition about the state of the world, i.e. it is logically impossible for
both propositions to be true.
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there is in fact no such path, then the alternative of taking the right
path fails to be open and up to me and my experience of choice turns
out to be illusory. Similarly, if an evil neurosurgeon has implanted a
device in my brain that prevents me from taking the right path then
my experience of choice is illusory as the option of taking the right
path  is  not  open  and  up  to  me.  These  cases  count  as  illusory
experiences because one of the experienced OU alternatives fails to
be open and up to the agent.13
This brings us to premise (3) in which I defend a necessary criterion
that an alternative has to fulfil in order for it to be open and up to the
agent.
(3) An alternative is an OU alternative (i.e. is open and up to the
agent) only if there exists an extension of the situation of choice
such that the agent realizes the alternative in that extension. 
The premise is intended to capture the idea that it must be possible
for the agent to realize the alternative in the situation she is in at the
moment of choice. The agent needs to be able to do something in
that  very  situation  such  that  she  realizes  the  OU  alternative  in
question. It is not enough for the agent to have the general ability to
13 Note  that  this  does  not  settle  the  question,  whether  the  agent  who
decides to realize the one alternative which is open (and not the illusory
one) has made a choice or not.  One can argue, that the agent could
have  tried  to  realize  the  other  alternative  and  in  this  sense  another
alternative was open and up to her. This, however, is not the focus of the
present  premise.  Here,  I  am  only  concerned  about  the  distinction
between veridical and illusory experiences of OU alternatives.
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act in a certain way (e.g. she can swim), but the agent needs to have
the specific ability to act in a certain way in the specific situation she
is in at the moment of choice (e.g. she can swim and is in a swimming
pool, etc.) in order to be able to realize the alternative. In other words,
an agent has an OU alternative to swim only if (i) she has the ability
to swim and (ii) she is at that moment in an appropriate situation for
swimming.  A situation is  appropriate for  swimming,  if  her  ability to
swim can  manifest  in  that  very situation.  E.g.  if  the  agent  is  in  a
swimming pool with water that has the right kind of temperature (e.g.
is not frozen or boiling), has the right kind of dimensions (e.g. is deep
and large enough), there is no external condition preventing her from
swimming (e.g. being tied to a big stone), and there is nothing about
her  physical  or  psychological  state  at  that  moment  preventing  her
from swimming, then she is in an appropriate situation for swimming.
Whether the situation is appropriate must be evaluated on a case by
case basis. If a situation is such that normally it would be appropriate
to manifest the action (e.g. she is in a swimming pool), but for some
special  reason  the  agent  cannot  manifest  her  ability  in  that  very
situation  (e.g.  she  has  a  cramp)  then  the  agent  is  not  in  an
appropriate situation  to  realize  the alternative  in  question.  Another
way to explain what  it  means for  a situation to be appropriate for
swimming  is  that  she  is  in  a  situation  such  that  she  has  the
opportunity to swim. She has an opportunity to swim, only if she is in
a specific situation where her ability to swim can manifest. A third way
to put this point is to argue that she does not only need to have the
causal  power  to  swim,  but  she  needs  to  be  able  to  exercise  her
causal power to swim in the situation she is in at that moment. I will
not attempt to give a full-fledged definition of an agent being in an
appropriate situation  such that  her  ability  can manifest  /  an  agent
having the opportunity to do something / an agent being in a situation
18
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such that she can exercise her causal power, but will only argue for a
necessary  condition  that  needs  to  be  fulfilled:  There  must  exist  a
possible continuation of the situation the agent is in at the moment of
choice such that  the agent  realizes the alternative in  that  possible
continuation. Possible  continuations  need  to  fulfil  a  set  of  criteria,
which I present below. I call the possible continuations which fulfil this
set of criteria extensions of a situation of choice. My claim is thus, that
there must exist an extension of the situation of choice such that the
agent realizes the OU alternative in that extension. Only if there exists
such an extension, an agent can be in an appropriate situation for
realizing  that  alternative  /  can  have  the  opportunity  to  realize  the
alternative / is in a situation such that she can exercise her causal
power to realize the alternative.
I use the term extension of a situation to express the fact that every
situation  has a  past  and  a  future.14  The past  of  that  situation  is
nothing  but  the  series  of  world-states  before  the  world-state
containing that situation. The future of that situation is nothing but the
series of world-states that come after the world-state containing that
situation. Let us apply this for a situation of choice. When an agent is
in a situation of choice, the world is in a determinate world-state. This
world-state has extensions in the past and in the future. All  world-
states that precede the world-state of the situation of choice are part
of the extension in the past of the situation of choice. All world-states
that come after the world-state of the situation of choice compose the
extension in the future of the situation of choice. 
Let us first look at the extension in the past. When an agent is in a
14 Unless the situation happens at  the beginning or end of  the world,  if
there is such a thing as a beginning or end of the world.
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situation of choice, she is in a determinate situation, i.e. the actual
world is in a determinate world-state at that moment. I call the series
of world-states in the actual world preceding the situation of choice
‘the actual past’. The actual past consists of one determinate series of
determinate world-states of the actual world which lead to the world-
state at the moment of the decision. This claim is obviously not about
our knowledge about  the series of  world-states which precede the
current situation. It is a metaphysical claim about the actual world. I
thus defend the view that the extension of a situation in the past is the
actual past  and that  the actual past is fixed as it  is  a determinate
series of determinate world-states.
Let  us  now turn  to  the  extension  of  a  situation  of  choice  in  the
future.15 Intuitively, there is an asymmetry between the past and the
future.  While  it  seems  intuitively  obvious  that  the  past  is  fixed,  it
seems less obvious that the future is fixed in the same way. There
seems to be some sense in  which the future is open or could be
open. When we make a choice, it seems not yet fixed what we are
going to do.16  I do not plan to tackle the question whether the future
is  in  fact  open or  fixed,  but  want  to  make a proposal  about  what
extensions  (in  the  future)  of  situation  of  choices  are  which  is
15 Note that when I  talk of  an extension of  a situation of  choice without
specifying whether I refer to the extension in the past or in the future, I
will be talking of the extension in the future.
16 Note that there are two senses in which the future can fail to be fixed.
Either it is not yet fixed which series of events is going to be the actual
future or nothing about the current situation one is in, including the laws
of nature, fixes the future series of event, although there exists only one
actual future. My suggested definition for extensions is intended to be as
neutral as possible and to allow for both possibilities.
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compatible with both possibilities. My proposal is thus not to consider
only whatever turns out to be the ‘actual future’ as the extension of
the situation of choice, but all worlds in which the agent is in the same
situation of choice as the situation of choice in the actual world. Given
that we are interested in the extension of a specific situation, we are
not interested in similar situations the agent could be in, but only in
that determinate situation the agent is in at that moment.  And as I
have argued above, the situation the agent is in has a determinate
extension in the past. So if  we consider extensions of situations in
which  the  agent  is  in  the  worlds  considered  they  have  the  same
extension in the past, i.e. these worlds have the same series of world-
states in the past as the actual world. 
The extensions (in the future) of a situation of choice are thus the
series of  world-states in  these worlds which share the situation of
choice  and  the  (extension  in  the)  past.  This  proposal  is  thus
compatible with the possibility that it is open whether there is only one
extension  or  whether  there  are  several  extensions  of  a  specific
situation.17
Note further  that  at  this  point  I  am only concerned about  possible
continuations of a determined situation of choice and not about other
types  of  possibilities  concerning  the  situation,  e.g.  the  question
whether such-and-such is/was possible simpliciter. In order to answer
questions of possibilities simpliciter, it is plausible that one does not
need to hold  fixed the past  and the world-state at  the moment  of
17 My  proposal  is  intended  to  be  neutral  about  whether  the  right
metaphysics  is  presentist,  eternalist,  or  whether  the  growing-block
theorist  is  right.  For  an  overview  on  the  metaphysics  of  time  see
Markosian (2014). 
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choice.  I  argue  that  an  extension  of  the  actual  world  at  a  given
moment has the stronger requirement that the world containing the
extension  in  question  needs  to  contain  the  exact  same  series  of
world-states up to that very moment (including the world-state at that
very moment).
This gives us the following necessary condition for an extension (in
the future) of a situation of choice,  where w@ refers to the actual
world:
(E1) A series of world-states s is as an extension of a situation of
choice at t in w@ only if there exists a world w in which s takes place
after t and that is in the same world-state as w@ at t and that has the
same series of world-states as w@ before t.18 
Are  cases  where  (after  the  situation  of  choice)  people  suddenly
disappear or start  to fly also extensions of the situation of choice?
Clearly not! In order to be able to give this answer,  I  need to talk
about the role of the laws of nature. The intuition that I want to defend
18 Note that I use the Lewisian possible world semantics, not because I
want to commit myself to the Lewisian possible worlds metaphysics, but
simply because I think it is a very useful (and widely shared) tool to make
precise statements about possibilities.
Further, I do not address the question of crossworld-identity in this work.
I presuppose that there is an intuitive sense in which a world-state (or a
series of world-state) can be the same in two worlds. I presuppose that
there is also an intuitive sense in which an agent is the same in different
worlds. I  also presuppose that we can use time indications which are
valid for all the worlds considered. 
22
The Phenomenology of Choice
here is the intuition that at the moment of the decision the world is
governed by laws of nature that constrain what the agent is able to
do. E.g. whether I can fly or disappear, does depend on the laws of
nature “governing” the situation I am in. This position is in contrast
with a reductionist  position of laws of nature which states that  the
laws of nature supervene on the events of the actual world. In that
case, what the laws of nature are depends on what I am going to do
and not the other way round. In the present work, I will not tackle this
debate19 and will assume a realist position on the laws of nature such
that what counts as an extension of the world is determined by the
laws of nature of the actual world.20 
This gives us the second necessary condition for an extension (in the
future) of a situation of choice:
(E2) A series of world-states s is as an extension of a situation of
choice at t in w@ only if there exists a world w which has the same
laws of nature as w@.
Based on (E1) and (E2), I put forward the following definition for an
extension (in the future) of a situation of choice:
(E) A series of world-states s is an extension of a situation of choice
at  t  in w@ iff  there exists a world w which has the same laws of
19 For an overview of the debate see Carroll (2012).
20 Note that while answering questions about possibilities simpliciter, it is
again  plausible  that  one  has  to  look  at  possible  worlds  with  slightly
different  laws of  nature.  But  for  extensions of  decision situations,  the
requirement I am defending is stricter.
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nature as w@ in which s takes place after t and that is in the same
world-state as w@ at t and that has the same series of world-states
as w@ before t.
In order to understand (3),  we also need a definition for  an agent
realizing an OU alternative in an extension of a situation of choice. I
use the following definition:
(R)  An agent  realizes an OU alternative A in  an extension E of  a
situation  of  choice,  if  the  series  of  world-states  of  E  contains  the
agent doing A.
These clarifications allow us to continue with (4).
(4)  In order for  an experience of  choice to be veridical,  there
must, for every OU alternative A given in that experience, exist
an extension of the actual situation of choice such that the OU
alternative A is realized in that extension.
(4) follows directly from (2) and (3). (2) states that for an experience
of choice to be veridical all OU alternatives given in that experience
need to be open and up to the agent. (3) states that in order for an
OU experience to be veridical there must exist an extension of the
situation of choice in which the agent realizes the experienced OU
alternative.  From this  we get  that  an experience of  choice can be
veridical only if there exists an extension for every experienced OU
alternative  such  that  the  agent  realizes  the  OU alternative  in  that
extension.
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(5) There is no single action an agent can do to realize more than
one  of  the  OU  alternatives  given  in  her  experience,  i.e.  the
realization of OU alternatives is mutually exclusive.
It would not be a real situation of choice if by realizing one alternative,
one would thereby also realize the other alternative(s).  It  is  thus a
necessary condition for a situation of choice, that by choosing, one
realizes  one  out  of  a  set  of  alternatives  and  by  realizing  that
alternative the other alternatives are not thereby realized too.
(6) Nomological determinism is true.
By nomological determinism I understand the following:
(ND)  Nomological  Determinism:  At  every instant  there  is  only  one
nomologically possible future,  i.e.  holding fixed the laws of  nature,
there exists only one possible future.
Note  that  (ND)  is  a  weaker  assumption  than  Causal  Determinism
(CD). (CD) implies (ND) and adds the requirement, that there is only
one nomologically  possible  future because of  the causal  laws.  My
argument thus does not target (CD) in particular, but every form of
determinism that implies the truth of (ND). 
(7) There exists only one extension (in the future) of a situation
of choice.
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Follows directly from (6) and the application of definition (E) about
extensions  of  situations.  In  order  for  there  to  be  more  than  one
extension  of  a  situation  of  choice,  more  than  one  nomologically
possible future of a given situation would need to exist. According to
nomological determinism, this is not the case.
(8)  Under  the  assumption  of  nomological  determinism,
experiences  of  choice  cannot  be  veridical  and  are  thus
systematically illusory.
Follows from (1), (4), (5) and (7). (1) states that in an experience of
choice at least two OU alternatives are experienced by the agent. (4)
states that  in order for  the experience of  choice to be veridical  all
experienced OU alternatives must be open and up to the agent and
that this is only the case if there exists an extension of the situation
for every experienced OU alternative such that the OU alternative is
realized in that extension. (5) adds the condition that the realization of
OU alternatives  is  mutually  exclusive.  Finally,  (7)  states  that  for  a
situation of choice there exists only one extension of the situation. 
If there exists only one extension of the situation, then it follows that
at most one alternative can be open and up to the agent. Only the
alternative which is  realized in the single existing extension of  the
situation  is  veridical.  And  given  that  alternatives  are  mutually
exclusive at most one alternative can be realized in this extension. In
other  words,  all  but  at  most  one  OU  alternative  are  illusory.  We
started from the premise that in order for the experience of choice to
be veridical all experienced OU alternatives need to be open and up
to the agent and that in experiences of choice at least two alternatives
are experienced as open and up to the agent. Given that at most one
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of  these  alternatives  can  be  veridical  and  all  others  have  to  be
illusory,  we  obtain  the  conclusion  that  experiences  of  choice  are
systematically illusory. 
In the following chapters, I address issues and points which allow me
to  motivate  the  premises  and  steps  used  in  my  incompatibility
argument.  The  main  focus  lies  on  the  correct  description  of  the
phenomenology of choice and especially the analysis of alternatives
which are open and up to the agent. I also present issues which are
related to the phenomena of choice in order to give a fuller picture
and show how my analysis fits in this picture. 
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3 The experience of OU alternatives
3.1 Overview
In  this  chapter,  I  address  different  questions  concerning  the
experience of OU alternatives. In section 3.2, I address the question
of how often we experience OU alternatives. I present both a maximal
and a minimal claim. According to the former we almost constantly
experience OU alternatives and according to the latter we experience
OU alternatives only in specific contexts of choice. Section 3.3 is on
the topic of how to count experienced OU alternatives. In section 3.4,
I discuss a prominent objection by Terence Horgan who argues that
our introspective capacities are too limited to warrant incompatibilist
claims about our experience and determinism. In section 3.5, I reply
to an argument by Richard Holton which states that incompatibilists
might erroneously take their claims to be global claims whereas they
are  only  warranted  to  local  claims  of  indeterminism.  Section  3.6
addresses the question whether we really experience OU alternatives
or whether we merely have beliefs about alternatives being open and
up  to  us.  Section  3.7 discusses  the  question  whether  agentive
experiences  of  OU  alternatives  are  perceptual  experiences  or
whether  they  are  a  different  kind  of  experience.  In  section  3.8,  I
present  a  fallback  position  for  my  incompatibility  argument  which
does  not  rely  on  the  existence  of  OU  experiences,  but  merely
requires  the assumption of  a  certain  type of  doxastic  state  of  the
agent. In section 3.9, I sketch an argument for incompatibilism similar
in structure to my incompatibility argument which only relies on beliefs
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about OU alternatives.
3.2 The ubiquity of OU alternatives
In  my  incompatibility  argument,  I  defend  the  view  that  in  an
experience of choice an agent experiences the situation she is in to
be  one  in  which  she  chooses  between  at  least  two  different  OU
alternatives. But how common are such experiences of choice? Are
all our actions such that we have an experience of choice? Or are
such experiences extremely rare and occur maybe only a few times in
a lifetime? Or do some people even never have such an experience?
I present a minimal claim and a maximal claim. 
The maximal claim is that we constantly experience OU alternatives
and that  every action is accompanied by an experience of choice.
The  minimal  claim  is  that  only  in  situations  where  the  agent  is
prompted to make a choice she has an experience of choice. I defend
the maximal claim (or something close to the maximum claim), but my
argument does not depend on the acceptance of this maximal claim.
My  incompatibility  thesis  relies  on  the  acceptance  of  the  minimal
claim.  However,  if  the  maximal  claim  or  something  close  to  the
maximal claim turns out to be true, it makes my case considerably
stronger. Assuming (nomological) determinism, we would, according
to the maximal claim, constantly have illusory experiences.
The main motivation to defend the maximal claim is based on the way
we  experience  our  environment.  We  do  not  merely  passively
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experience our environment as something we merely observe21, but
we experience our environment as something we can interact with. Or
put slightly differently, we experience many interaction-opportunities.
If I sit at my desk, sitting in front of my computer, I experience the
situation I am in to be such that there are many things I could do in
that very situation at that moment. For instance, I could take a sip
from my mug of coffee, I could open the window, I could click on the
icon of my mail-programme to check my mail, I could open the drawer
of my desk, I could start typing, etc.22  These alternatives are given to
me even if I am not deliberating or thinking about what I can do right
now. I do not need to ask myself what I can do right now, in order for
these alternatives to be present in my experience. Obviously, not all
alternatives which are open and up to me at that moment are given to
me in my experience and some alternatives given to me can turn out
to be illusory. Furthermore, some OU alternatives are more salient
than others. Which alternatives are given to me and which are more
or  less  salient  in  a  situation  might  vary  much  from  situation  to
situation. At times, many alternatives are given to me. For instance,
when I am sitting at my desk considering what I could do next, many
alternatives are likely to be present in my experience. At other times,
only  very few alternatives  might  be  given  to  me,  e.g.  when  I  am
focussed on a specific task like drawing a picture. In that case, what
might be given to me are different ways of continuing executing my
current  task  – in  this  case different  ways to  continue drawing the
21 Cf. the Weather Watchers in Strawson (1994). 
22 A related  topic  is  the  theory  of  affordances  developed  by  James  J.
Gibson. Roughly, affordances are action-possibilities of the environment
which depend on the agent.  Cf.  Gibson (1966),  Gibson (1979),  Reed
(1996), Withagen et al. (2012). 
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picture. Alternatives like standing up or opening the drawer might be
completely absent from my experience during the execution of this
task. 
If  these  descriptions  about  our  phenomenology  are  right,  they
motivate my maximal claim about OU alternatives:
(MAX) Under normal conditions, at least two alternatives are given to
an agent in her experience to be open and up to her.
 
In other words, whenever an agent is in normal conditions she has at
least two alternatives present in her experience. But what are normal
conditions? I will  not try to give a definition in order to capture the
exact  set  of  conditions which need to be fulfilled in  order  to  have
normal conditions, but rely on a vague intuitive understanding. The
motivation for this clause is to exclude potentially problematic cases
such as being under  drug-effects,  meditating,  day-dreaming,  being
close to being asleep,  being extremely focussed,  and maybe also
doing routine actions in an almost automatic fashion or being under
extreme stress. As mentioned above, this list is not intended to be
complete, but merely to give an idea of the cases my claim is not
intended to  cover.23 The cases I  intend to cover  by my claim are
cases like an agent walking who has the experience of different paths
being open and up to him, an agent standing in front of a plate filled
with cookies who has the experience of being able to take either of
23 Note that I do not claim, that in those cases it is not possible that several
OU alternatives are given to the agent. I simply acknowledge that there
are  special  situations  in  which  it  is  not  the  case  that  at  least  two
alternatives are given to the agent as open and up to her.
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these  cookies.  An  agent  sitting  at  her  desk  experiencing  the
alternative to be able to stand up or remaining seated. In these cases
the agent is not or at least does not have to be deliberating about
these alternatives. The agent is probably not even paying attention to
these alternatives. Yet they are present in her experience and every
time the agent acts, she does realize one of these alternatives. This
does  not  presuppose  that  the  agent  would  characterize  her
experience as making a choice about which alternative to realize. But
nevertheless,  by  realizing  one  of  the  alternatives  she  chooses  an
alternative among the ones given to her.  This is admittedly a very
weak  sense  of  choice,  but  still  a  case  of  choice  if  by  choice  we
understand ‘realizing an alternative given to the agent as open and up
to her rather than an other alternative which was given to the agent to
be open and up to her, too’. If we accept the maximal claim about the
experience of OU alternatives (MAX) we get the following maximal
claim about experiences of choice:
(MAX-C) Under normal conditions, at least two alternatives are given
to an agent in her experience to be open and up to her. Every time
she realizes one of these alternatives (by acting, continuing to act or
stopping to act24, the agent has thereby an experience of choice.25
24 This  proposal  thus  also  covers  continuing  or  aborting  actions  with  a
longer duration (e.g. going home, cooking a meal, drinking a beer, etc.).
During the performance of such actions, we normally experience it as
open  and  up  to  us  to  stop  or  continue  doing  what  we  are  doing.
According to (MAX-C) these are all also cases of experience of choice.
25 This definition is not  particularly intuitive,  because an agent might  be
reluctant  to  characterize  her  experience  as  an  experience  of  choice.
However, I do not try to give an intuitive notion of experience of choice,
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If  we  accept  the  truth  of  (MAX-C)  then  it  turns  out  –  under  the
assumption of  nomological  determinism – that  whenever  an agent
acts  under  normal  conditions (in  the sense described above),  she
has,  according  to  my  incompatibility  argument,  an  illusory
experience.26 
Whether we experience as many OU alternatives as claimed above is
a controversial  matter.  Some people might flatly deny the maximal
claim. For this reason, I  want to provide a fallback position for my
argument which accommodates a rejection of the maximal claim. This
brings us to my minimal claim. The idea of the minimal claim is that
whenever we are in a situation in which we are prompted to make a
choice,  we  have  at  least  two  alternatives  given  to  us  in  our
experience which we experience as open and up to us.  Cases of
choice  I  have  in  mind  here  are:  e.g.  an  agent  deliberating  about
whether to take the left or the right path or an agent in front of the
fridge deliberating about whether to take a beer or a juice, an agent
deliberating about what to do after work, or an agent who is at the
gelateria  who  has  to  choose  the  flavour  of  her  ice-cream  and  is
unsure about which flavour she fancies most right now. These are all
but I introduce it as a technical term. 
26 Note that this claim is intended to cover only cases of action and not all
cases of activity by the subject which also includes doings or so-called
sub-intentional actions. The agent needs to have at least some kind of
conscious control over her action. If an agent sitting in a train wiggles her
foot unconsciously while reading a book, the wiggling does not count as
an experience of choice. A defence of “sub-intentional actions” can be
found in Steward (2009), a defence of “doings” in Nida-Rümelin (2007).
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situations in which the agent is actively considering the alternatives
which are given to her. The agent is considering these alternatives
because she experiences them as open and up to her. It seems to
her, that she can act so as to realize one of these alternatives. This
gives us my minimal claim about OU alternatives:
(MIN) Whenever an agent is in a situation in which she is prompted to
make  a  choice  at  least  two  alternatives  are  given  to  her  in  her
experience to be open and up to her. 
On the basis of (MIN) we can directly formulate the minimal claim
about experiences of choice:
(MIN-C) Whenever an agent is in a situation in which she is prompted
to make a choice at  least  two alternatives are given to her in her
experience to be open and up to her. Every time she realizes one of
these alternatives (by acting), the agent has thereby an experience of
choice.
While on the one hand, (MAX-C) might seem to be too strong a claim,
(MIN-C) might on the other hand seem to be too weak. Obviously, it is
possible to defend a claim which is between the two claims proposed
here. Experiences of choice might not only happen during clear cases
of choice, but they might accompany a broader category of actions. It
is possible to defend such a view, without having to defend that all
actions (under normal conditions) are experienced as experiences of
choice in the technical sense described above.
Above, I have stated that experienced OU alternatives might be more
or  less  salient  to  the  agent.  A related,  but  different  point  is  that
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experienced  OU alternatives  can  have  a  more  or  less  specific  or
precise  content.  In  some  cases,  the  experienced  OU alternatives
might be very specific. For instance, if I deliberate about whether to
press the left or the right button, the two experienced OU alternatives
are  very  specific  and  not  vague  at  all.  But  experienced  OU
alternatives  are  not  always  this  specific.  Some  experienced  OU
alternatives  might  be  much  more  vague.  The  extreme  case  is  to
experience having the OU alternative of doing something else than
what one is doing right now. This experience does not contain any
specific content about the alternative which is experienced as open
and up to the agent. I am inclined to think that specificity comes in
degrees.  I  do  not  address  whether  saliency  or  specificity  has  an
influence  on  the  defence  of  my argument,  but  at  first  sight  there
seems to be no reason to believe so. 
3.3 The difficulty of counting alternatives
I  have  been  arguing  that  in  an  experience  of  choice  an  agent
experiences at least two OU alternatives. But how should we count
OU alternatives?27  Does  having  the  experience  of  being  able  to
switch on the light (by flicking the switch) and the experience of being
able to flick the switch count as two alternatives? Does having the
experience  of  being  able  to  flick  the  switch  fast  and  having  the
experience  of  being  able  to  flick  the  switch  slowly  count  as  two
27 This  question  is  obviously  related  to  the  questions  of  how  to  count
actions. Cf. Davidson (1971).
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different OU alternatives? It seems to me that the first answer should
be answered negatively.  Answering the second question is  harder.
Both a yes and a no could be acceptable answers. In favour of the
latter option speaks the fact that there seems to be only a marginal
difference between the two options.  In  favour of  the former option
speaks that there is a difference given to the agent in her experience.
Before providing answers to these cases, I would like to look at my
motivation for my claim that in an experience of choice we have at
least two OU alternatives. In order for something to be experienced
as  an  OU  alternative,  it  must  seem  to  the  agent  that  there  is
something the agent can do in order to realize that alternative in the
very situation  the agent  is  in  at  that  moment.  Claiming that  in  an
experience of choice at least two OU alternatives must be given in
that  experience amounts to claiming that  it  is  false that  one could
have an experience of choice if only one OU alternative was given in
that experience. In slightly other words, if it seems to an agent that
there is nothing else she can do, but to realize a specific alternative,
then she does not have an experience of choice. The question then
remains  the  same,  i.e.  what  are  the  identification  criteria  for  OU
alternatives. 
I would like to make the following suggestion. It  must seem to the
agent  that  realizing  one alternative  rather  than the other  makes a
difference about the future development of the world. Further, it must
seem to the agent that it is up to her which alternative is going to be
realized, in the sense that it must seem to her that she controls the
future  development  of  the  situation  she  is  in.  This  does  not  just
amount  to  the  trivial  assumption  that  it  seems  to  the  agent  that
whatever happens is a consequence of her action. It requires that it
seems to the agent that she has control over which of the alternatives
is realized.  On this basis,  I  would like to put  forward the following
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definition:
(Id) Two OU alternatives C and D are distinct OU alternatives in a
given situation S for an agent A iff 
(Id1) it  seems to the agent that  she has control  over whether she
realizes C or D and 
(Id2) from the agent’s perspective the development of the situation S
is different depending on whether she realizes C or D.
According  to  this  definition,  switching  on  the  light  (by  flicking  the
switch)  and flicking the switch  will  thus not  count  as two different
alternatives. From the agent’s perspective, choosing one alternative
rather than the other makes no difference for the development of the
situation the agent is in. There is however a difference in the agent's
experience of flicking the switch fast or slowly. It seems to the agent
that there is a difference between the two alternatives such that the
development  of  the  actual  situation  turns  out  to  be  different
dependent on which alternative is realized. In other words, the agent
seems to have two different alternatives open to her which seem to
be  two  different  developments  of  the  situation  she  is  in  at  that
moment and it seems to her to be up to her which of the alternatives
she realizes. She can choose whether she flicks the switch fast or
slowly.  Although  the  two  alternatives  are  very  similar,  they
nevertheless  count  as  two  different  alternatives  according  to  my
proposal because both (Id1) and (Id2) are fulfilled. Further, in cases
where alternatives C and D lead to the same result  by a different
path, C and D count as distinct if the development of the situation is a
different one from the agent’s perspective. For instance, if there are
two  switches  that  can  be  used  to  turn  on  the  light,  it  makes  a
difference  for  the  development  of  the  situation  whether  the  agent
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flicks the first or the second switch (e.g. the agent will have moved to
either the first or the second switch), although she will have turned on
the light in both cases. What matters here is not the description of the
alternative, but whether a difference between the two developments
of the situation is given to the agent in her experience.
3.4 The limits of introspection 
3.4.1 Overview
In this section, I discuss, based on the work of Terence Horgan, the
worry whether we have sufficient introspective competence to be able
to answer certain types of questions about one’s agentive experience.
For instance, one might wonder whether it is possible to simply “read
off” the answer to the question whether our agentive experience can
be  veridical  if  determinism  were  true.  Trying  to  answer  such  a
technical  question  by  simply  reading  off  the  answer  from  one's
experience  might  indeed  indicate  an  overestimation  of  one’s
competences. But even if one does not claim to be able to just read
off the answer to the compatibility question, it still seems reasonable
to wonder whether one has the necessary introspective competence
to  answer  the  question  on  the  basis  of  careful  phenomenological
work. 
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Horgan28 defends the position that tackling the compatibility question
is a cognitively extremely demanding task with many difficulties that
might lead to wrong answers. The cognitive requirements are in fact
so challenging that a normal human being cannot reliably answer the
compatibility  question  by introspection  alone,  i.e.  by merely focally
attending to her phenomenology. 
Horgan suggests that we have this kind of limitation by pointing to the
fact  that  normal  human conceptual  competence mainly consists  in
applying concepts to concrete cases and not to general hypotheses.
In order to answer general hypotheses like the compatibility question
one  also  needs  to  take  into  account  the  agent’s  counterfactual
phenomenal  profile,  i.e.  what  she  would  have  experienced  in  a
counterfactual scenario. Horgan argues that in order to answer the
compatibility  question  it  is  not  sufficient  to  take  into  account  the
phenomenological data, but one needs to take into consideration all
information available to us. In the light of the total evidence available
to  us,  we  can then weigh  the  pros  and cons  in  order  to  give  an
answer  to  the  compatibility  question  by  inference  to  the  best
explanation.
In the next subsections, I discuss Horgan's argument as presented in
his 2007 paper “Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of
Introspection”. 
28 Horgan (2007) and Horgan (2011) based on earlier collaborative work
Horgan&Tienson (2002) and Horgan et al. (2003).
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3.4.2 Horgan's  argument  on  the  limits  of
introspection
Horgan begins his argumentation with the following three claims:
“First,  the  phenomenal  character  of  experience  is  narrow,  in  this
sense: it  is not constitutively dependent upon anything “outside the
head” of the experiencing creature.” (Horgan 2007, p. 1)
“Second,  virtually  all  aspects  of  the  phenomenal  character  of
experience  are  intentional:  phenomenal  character  represents  the
world as being various ways.” (Horgan 2007, p. 2)
“Third,  the  most  fundamental  kind  of  mental  intentionality  is  fully
constituted by phenomenal character.” (Horgan 2007, p. 2)
He considers these three claims to be – prima facie – in tension with
the following fourth claim:
“Fourth,  for  certain  philosophically  important  questions  about  the
phenomenally  constituted  intentional  content  of  experience,
introspection by itself does not reliably generate an answer.” (Horgan
2007, p. 3)
The goal of his argumentation is to show that these four claims can
be reconciled. One of the philosophically important questions is the
compatibility  question  between  agentive  phenomenology  and  the
truth of state-causal determinism.29  
Accepting  that  our  (agentive)  phenomenology  is  narrow  and
intentional, we should be able to discover by introspection30 whether
agentive  phenomenology  and  determinism  are  compatible.  But
29 In  my  incompatibility  argument,  my  target  is  the  broader  concept  of
nomological  determinism. For  the present discussion of  the point,  not
much should depend on this difference.
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according to Horgan this is not possible. He provides three different
explanations  of  why  it  is  not  possible  to  answer  the  compatibility
question by introspection alone. He rejects the first two and endorses
the third. Let us start with the first tentative explanation.
3.4.3 Horgan’s first tentative explanation
According  to  the  first  tentative  explanation31,  we  cannot  give  an
answer to the compatibility question by introspection alone because
there are parts of the experienced content which refer to objects or
properties whose essence is not revealed in experience. Applying this
to my argument, the explanation would be the following. While I can
introspect  that  there  is  some  feature  F  that  makes  it  that  the
alternative  A is  open  and  up  to  me,  I  cannot  introspect  that  the
specific feature F* which makes it that the alternative is open and up
to  me is  that  my neuron's  are  arranged  in  a  specific  manner  M.
Whether the agentive phenomenology is compatible with determinism
depends on this non-introspectable feature and thus the compatibility
question cannot be answered by introspection alone.
Horgan  rejects  this  proposal  because  intuitively  the  veridicality
30 Horgan distinguishes between a thin and a robust sense of introspection.
The former consists in merely focally attending the qualitative character
of  one's  experience.  The  latter  requires  additionally  the  forming  of
judgements based on what one is focally attending to. (Horgan (2007), p.
16f)
31 Horgan (2007), p. 12f.
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conditions of the agentive phenomenology of my twin-earth-duplicate
(TEP) who has the same agentive phenomenology as I have should
correspond  to  the  veridicality  conditions  of  my  agentive
phenomenology.  And  thus,  whether  the  phenomenal  content  is
compatible with determinism is the same for both me and my TEP
and should not be dependent on non-introspectable features which
differ between me and my TEP.
3.4.4 Horgan’s second tentative explanation
According to Horgan's second tentative explanation32, the reason why
we cannot answer the compatibility question from introspection alone
is that the presentational phenomenal content  of the experience is
dependent on the agent's counterfactual phenomenal profile – that is,
what the agent's phenomenal content would look like under different
counterfactual situations – and the related judgemental tendencies for
the application of the concepts used in answering the compatibility
question.33 Given  that  it  is  not  possible  to  have  the  complete
counterfactual profile and the judgemental tendencies one has before
one's  mind  in  introspection  it  is  not  possible  to  answer  the
compatibility question by introspection alone.
Horgan rejects  this  proposal  because it  gets  the relation  between
32 Horgan (2007), p. 14ff.
33 Note  that  Horgan  distinguishes  between  presentational  content  and
judgemental  content.  The  latter  is  dependent  on  the  former  and  the
application of sophisticated concepts. (Horgan 2007, p. 6f)
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presentational content and the counterfactual phenomenal profile and
the judgemental tendencies wrong. The counterfactual profile and the
judgemental tendencies primarily depend on the already-determined
presentational  content  to  be  appropriate  (and  not  the  other  way
round). And thus, one should reject the idea that the counterfactual
phenomenal  profile  and  the  judgemental  tendencies  somehow
constitute the presentational content. 
3.4.5 Horgan's endorsed explanation
Let  us  now  turn  to  Horgan's  endorsed  explanation  of  why  the
compatibility question is not answerable by introspection alone34. This
third  explanation  grants that  the  content  of  the  experience is  fully
determined by the occurrent presentational content of the agentive
experience.  But  the  answering  of  the  compatibility  question  which
requires  a lot  of  conceptual  sophistication is  too  demanding to be
done by introspection:
“[A]nswering  such  questions  solely  via  robust  introspection  would
require a degree of cognitive skill in the deployment of the pertinent
concepts, and in the formation of beliefs about one’s phenomenology
with  the  pertinent  kind  of  judgmental  content  vis-à-vis  that
phenomenology,  that  far  exceeds  what  is  required  for  the
conceptually competent  use of  these concepts.  Indeed,  it  probably
exceeds  the  cognitive  capacities  of  humans  altogether.”  (Horgan
2007, p.17)
34 Horgan 2007, p. 16ff.
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On Horgan's view, there is an answer to the compatibility question
which is fully determined by the phenomenal content, but we do not
have  the  sufficient  conceptual  skills  to  find  the  answer  by  sole
introspection. One of the reasons why answering this question is so
demanding is that by trying to answer the compatibility question one
needs  to  form  sophisticated  judgements  about  the  compatibility
between  the  presentational  content  and  the  assumption  of
determinism which themselves (the judgements)  have judgemental
content (about the presentational content). This raises the likelihood
for  different  types  of  fallibilities  in  the  application  of  the  required
concepts.
Our  capacity  of  applying  concepts  is  normally  used  in  concrete
situations.  But  answering  a  compatibility  question  by  introspection
requires a direct, intuitive judgement about a general hypothesis. This
is, according to Horgan, much more a matter of abductive reasoning
than  of  robust  introspection.  In  order  to  answer  the  compatibility
question the whole  counterfactual  phenomenal  profile  needs to be
taken into consideration as well as other considerations that might be
relevant to the question. 
Horgan provides a possible explanation of why the answering of the
compatibility  question  by  introspection  might  lead  to  fallacious
answers.  Referring  to  the  contextualist  position  concerning
knowledge,  Horgan  suggest  that  the  application  of  the  concept  of
agency (and also freedom) might  be subject  to  contextual  effects,
too.35 Similarly,  to  the  knowledge  case,  where  according  to  the
contextualist, the very posing of the knowledge question, raises the
35 Note that the contextual effect does not affect the presentational content
itself, but only the judgemental level of the application of the concept. 
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requirements for the application of the concept, the consideration of
the  compatibility  question  might  raise  the  requirements  for  the
concept of action (and freedom) such that it is no longer compatible
with  determinism  although  in  less  demanding  typical  everyday
settings  the  applications  of  the  concept  is  compatible  with
determinism. 
“That is, the very posing of the question one is introspectively trying to
answer is apt to induce a shift in the implicit contextual parameters
that govern the concepts freedom and agency away from their default
values—and  toward  limit-case  parameter  settings,  under  which
judgmental attributions of agency and freedom become incompatible
with state-causal determinism (and with physical causal closure, and
with the mental state-causation of behavior).” (Horgan 2007, p. 23)
Another challenge that might happen during the introspective process
is failing to distinguish between not having an experience of A and
having an experience of not A. More precisely, one might conflate not
having the experience that one's choice is state-causally determined
with  the  experience  that  one's  choice  is  not  state-causally
determined. While the latter experience is incompatible with the truth
of  state-causal  determinism,  the  compatibility  question  cannot  be
answered solely on the basis of the former experience. (Horgan 2007,
p. 21)
3.4.6 Discussion of Horgan's argument
I concur with Horgan's analysis that we should resist the temptation of
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trying to directly “read off” the compatibility question in one immediate
act of introspection. While the answer to the compatibility question
might  seem obvious  to  some,  Horgan  has  convincingly  made  the
case that there are many possible fallacies which need be taken into
consideration while attempting to answer the compatibility question.
The conflation between not  experiencing one's  choice to be state-
causally determined with experiencing one's choice to not be state-
causally  determined  might  indeed  play  a  role  in  some  too  quick
replies to the compatibility question. 
Horgan's case for the contextual effect would turn out to be an issue,
if one were able to find concrete cases which show that contextual
effects influence our use of the concept of agency (and/or freedom) in
a problematic way. Until such examples have been presented, I see
no sufficient reason to believe that such contextual effects influence
our concept application in a way that hinders us from answering the
compatibility question correctly.  Being aware of a potential threat, I
set this issue aside in the present work.
I  agree  with  Horgan  that  there  is  a  determinate  answer  to  the
compatibility  question  which  depends  solely  on  the  presentational
content of our agentive phenomenology and thus, I also agree with
Horgan's  rejection  of  the  first  two  tentative  explanations.   Most
importantly,  I  agree with Horgan's central point that a single act of
introspection does not suffice to answer the compatibility question. 
Nevertheless, I do think that we can give a reply to the compatibility
question on the basis  of  introspection – which is what  I  do in  my
incompatibility  argument.  Although the most  important  steps  of  my
incompatibility  argument  are  motivated  by  introspective  work,  the
argument  relies  on  steps  which  are  not  done  by  introspection.  In
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order to defend my argument, one needs to find by introspection a
feature which is present in our experiences of choice. I argue that this
feature is the open-and-up-to-me-ness of alternatives in experiences
of  choice. Once we have found this feature in our experience,  we
need to consider different concrete cases or scenarios and consult
our intuitions on the application of the concept of open-and-up-to-me-
ness in order to define the veridicality conditions of this feature. In
other words, I agree with Horgan that our counterfactual phenomenal
profile plays a central role in answering the compatibility question and
that  it  relies on our  presentational  content  (and not  the other  way
round,  as  suggested  in  the  rejected  second  explanation).  On  the
basis  of  our  application  of  the  concept  in  different  cases  we  can
discover the veridicality conditions. My claim is thus clearly not that
we can find out by one single act of introspection that an alternative is
open and up to the agent  only if  there exists  an extension of  the
actual  situation  in  which  she  realizes  that  alternative.  Rather,  the
claim is based on the analysis of different cases in order to establish
the appropriateness of the proposed veridicality conditions. Once we
have  found  the  veridicality  conditions  of  the  experience  of  OU
alternatives, we can turn to the non-introspective question of finding
out  whether  these  conditions  are  compatible  with  the  truth  of
determinism. 
Another point raised by Horgan I would like to discuss is his claim that
in analysing whether the agentive phenomenology is compatible with
determinism we should keep in mind that an analysis which states
that our experience is veridical should be preferred over an analysis
which has as a consequence that our experience is systematically
illusory. And given that we have good reasons to believe in the truth
of  state-causal  determinism  we  have  reason  to  argue  for  the
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compatibilism of our experience.
“For,  if  in  fact  the  satisfaction  conditions  of  agentive  experience
require  the  falsity  of  determinism,  physical  causal  closure,  or  the
mental state-causation of behavior, then actual epistemic standards
are far too lax—since (let’s face it) we not only lack good evidence
against all three hypotheses, but we possess rather good evidence in
favor of at least two of them (viz., physical causal closure and the
mental state-causation of  behavior).  So, the fact that compatibilism
fits  with  actual  epistemic  standards  we  employ  in  our  beliefs  and
assumptions  about  the  reality  of  agency,  whereas  incompatibilism
does  not,  is  itself  powerful  abductive  evidence  in  favor  of
compatibilism.” (Horgan 2007, p. 21)
While  I  agree  with  Horgan  that  getting  the result  that  we  have  a
systematically illusory experience would be a challenging result, this
point should nevertheless not substantially influence our analysis. It is
unproblematic, if it motivates a philosopher to look for the reason why
the  experience  is  compatible  with  determinism.  But  avoiding  the
potentially challenging result does not in itself constitute a reason in
favour  of  the  compatibility  between  our  agentive  experiences  and
determinism – unless this merely means that if the question remains
unanswered after careful analysis, we should favour the option that
fits our currently accepted theories best.
In line with Horgan's point we also get the result that if the answer to
the  compatibility  question  is  that  our  agentive  experience  is
incompatible  with  the  truth  of  determinism,  we  get  a  reason  for
rejecting  the  thesis  of  determinism  (which  obviously  needs  to  be
evaluated together with the other reasons in favour of or against the
truth of determinism). 
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3.5 Local vs. global compatibility claims
In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting (2009) Richard Holton defends
the view – in his chapter on the phenomenology of free will  – that
people who argue that our experience of free will justifies claims of
incompatibility with determinism are inclined to make a certain kind of
mistake.  In  this  section,  I  address  this  worry  and  show  that  my
argument does not rely on this fallacy.
Holton argues that although we do have the experience of not being
determined by our beliefs and desires while choosing, we do not have
the experience of  not  being determined by the whole state of  the
world. We mistake our experience of local indetermination (the former
one) with an experience of global indetermination (the latter one). In
order to be justified to judge that our experience is incompatible with
the truth of determinism, it  is not enough to have an experience of
local indetermination because this experience is compatible with our
choice being determined by something additional to our beliefs and
desires. In order to defend an incompatibility claim an experience of
global indetermination is needed.
I agree with Holton, that we do not have an experience of the whole
state of the world not determining our choice. I agree for two reasons.
First,  if  by having an experience of the total  state of the world we
mean  having  all  features  of  the  total  state  of  the  world  being
presented in our experience then it is evident that we do not have and
cannot have such an experience. Second, I think it is inappropriate to
describe  the  content  of  an  experience  by  using  the  technical
vocabulary of being determined or not being determined. The use of
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technical  vocabulary  to  describe  the  content  of  our  agentive
experience of choice requires too much philosophical sophistication
to give an uncontroversial  description of our experience, especially
when  the  goal  of  the  investigation  is  to  determine  whether  the
experience is compatible with determinism or not. In order to avoid
the possible difficulties implied by applying technical  vocabulary to
describe the content of our experience of choice, I avoid claims about
experiences of being determined or not being determined. In other
words, not only do I not make the claim that my experience of choice
is undetermined by the total state of the world, but I also avoid the
use of the claims of local indetermination (which Holton considers to
be correct).
Note that even if we avoid the talk of having an experience of being
determined or of not being undetermined, Holton is right to point to
the fact that we need to be careful to keep the distinction between
global  claims  and  local  claims  intact.  For  instance,  if  we  could
establish that the content of our experience of choice (described in
non technical vocabulary) is not determined by our current beliefs and
desires, this still allows for the possibility that the choice is determined
by the total state of the world. In order to defend that our experience
of choice is not compatible with the truth of determinism we need to
find an experience which justifies a global claim. Given that – as we
just have seen – we cannot experience the total state of the world (in
the sense that not all features of the total state of the world can be
presented  in  our  experience),  it  seems  that  there  is  no  way  to
establish that our experience is incompatible with the total state of the
world  determining  our  choice  and  so  it  is  impossible  to  make  a
justified  global  incompatibility  claim.  Holton is  thus  right  that  if  we
were required to have an experience of the total state of the world
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being incompatible  with  our  choice  being  determined by  that  total
state, we would be in a very bad position to argue that our experience
is incompatible with the truth of determinism (in the sense that our
experience could not be veridical if determinism was true).
However,  in  my  argument,  I  do  not  make  any  claims  about
experiencing compatibilities or incompatibilities between features of
our  current  situation  and  OU alternatives.  I  do  not  claim  that  we
experience  the  compatibility  between  the  experienced  OU
alternatives and our beliefs and desires. What I do claim is simply,
that  we have,  in  situations of  choice,  at  least  two OU alternatives
being presented to us. We do not have, on top of the experience of
having OU alternative A and OU alternative B, the experience of OU
alternative  A  being  compatible  with  OU  alternative  B  or  the
experience  of  OU alternative  A being  compatible  with  my  current
beliefs and desires and OU alternative B being compatible with my
current beliefs and desires or with all the features being presented to
us in experience. I do not exclude that such claims can be defended,
but given that I do not rely on such claims about the content of our
agentive experience in my argument, I wish to remain neutral about
the correctness of  such claims.  According to my argument,  all  we
need is the claim that in experiences of choice we experience to have
at  least  two  OU  alternatives.  The  incompatibility  between
experiencing these two OU alternatives and the truth of determinism
is not something which is presented to us in our experience such that
we are directly justified in making the claim that our experience of
choice is incompatible with the truth of determinism, but something
we can only find out after careful argumentation. The incompatibility
can only be defended by finding out that for our experience of choice
to be veridical there must exist for every OU alternative an extension
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of the current situation with the agent realizing that alternative and
that  this  is  not  possible  under  the  assumption  of  nomological
determinism.
An important assumption in my argument is what I call the “fixity of
the situation”. Although the total state of the world is not presented in
the experience, it is nevertheless fixed at the moment the experience
is taking place. Whether the experience is veridical depends on how
the world is at that very moment. And thus, if the veridicality of the two
experienced  OU  alternatives  depends  on  having  two  different
extensions of the current situation, it does not matter whether there
exist  slightly  different  situations  from  the  actual  situation  (with  a
slightly different  past  or  slightly different  laws of  nature)  which we
cannot  differentiate  on the base of  the  experience which do have
extensions  such  that  the  OU  alternatives  are  realized.36 All  that
matters for the veridicality of the experience are the extensions of the
exact  world-state  the  agent  is  in  while  having  her  experience  of
choice. On the basis of  this assumption it  is  possible to make the
global  claim  that  the  experience  of  choice  cannot  be  veridical  if
(nomological) determinism was true.
3.6 Experiences or beliefs? 
In  my  argument,  I  claim  that  we  experience  OU alternatives.  But
36 The central  point  for  my argument  is  that  – under the assumption of
nomological determinism – no single situation has two extensions of the
situation such that both the experienced OU alternatives are realized in
the respective extension. 
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could it not be the case that we merely have beliefs about having OU
alternatives rather than experiencing OU alternatives? In this section,
I explain my motivations for my claim that we do in fact experience
OU  alternatives.  In  section  3.7,  I  address  the  question  whether
experiences  of  OU  alternatives  are  nothing  but  perceptual
experiences. And in section  3.8 I present a fallback position for my
incompatibility argument which does not presuppose the existence of
experiences of OU alternatives. 
A doubt  whether  we  really  experience OU alternatives  could  arise
from the fact that we usually do have beliefs about alternatives being
open and up to us. So why should we think that there is something
additional  to  these  beliefs?  Why  should  we  accept  that  the
experiences of OU alternatives are something different than beliefs of
having  OU  alternatives?  In  my  incompatibility  argument,  I  defend
premise (1) by arguing that by carefully attending to our experiences
of choice we notice that in these experiences it seems to us that it is
open and up to us to choose one out of at least two OU alternatives.
In order to defend the thesis that experiences of OU alternatives are
something different from beliefs about OU alternatives I argue for the
plausibility of a case in which our beliefs about what alternatives are
open and up to us diverge from the alternatives we experience to be
open and up to us. These are cases in which in spite of experiencing
an  alternative  being  open  and  up  to  us  we  nevertheless  do  not
believe this alternative to be open and up to us. These cases are
similar to Müller-Lyer cases, in which we do believe the lines to be of
the same length although we do experience them to be of different
length. 
Let me suggest the following case where the contents of the agentive
experiences and the contents of the belief about the OU alternatives
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arguably fail to coincide. Note that in order to defend my claim it is
enough to grant the possibility of a case similar to the following one.
Suppose I am standing in front of a table with shortbread cookies and
chocolate cookies placed on it. I experience the situation to be such
that I can either take a shortbread cookie or a chocolate cookie, i.e.
both alternatives are experienced as OU alternatives. A trustworthy
source now tells me that the chocolate cookies are glued to the table.
I do believe that this person tells me the truth and thus believe that it
is not open and up to me to grab a chocolate cookie although there is
no visual hint that the cookies are glued to the table. I claim that in
such a case, I could have the experience that it is open and up to me
to grab a chocolate cookie although I believe this experience to be
illusory. In such a case it seems to me that it is open and up to me to
grab the chocolate cookie, but I do not believe that it is in fact so. In
this  case  my  belief  and  my  experience  about  the  alternative  of
grabbing a chocolate cookie diverge. Although I have, in the light of
new information changed my belief about what alternatives are open
and  up  to  me,  the  content  of  my  experience  has  remained  the
same.37
37 There are cases in  which the experience might  be influenced by the
subject's beliefs. These are cases of  so-called “cognitive penetration”.
For  instance,  Susanna  Siegel  (2012)  presents  the  case  of  “Angry
Looking Jack”. Because Jill believes that Jack is angry with her, she then
perceives  him  as  being  angry  with  her.  Her  belief  has  changed  her
perceptual  experience.  For  my  argument,  I  merely  argue  for  the
possibility  that  the  agent  in  the  cookie-choice-scenario  might  not  be
subject to cognitive penetration and continue to experience the cookie to
be such that it is open and up to her to grab it even after acquiring the
belief that it is not open and up to her to grab it.
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Let  me say something more about  how I  conceive of  the  relation
between our beliefs about OU alternatives and our experiences of OU
alternatives.  Normally,  we base our beliefs about  what  alternatives
are open and up to us on the way we experience our situation – more
specifically on the experienced OU alternatives in a given situation.
Unless we have reason to doubt that our experience is veridical, we
form  the  belief  that  we  do  have  the  OU  alternative  we  are
experiencing. When we have information which conflicts with what we
experience, we might question the veridicality of the experience, i.e.
we might question whether what seems to be the case according to
our experience really is the case. I take the case of experienced OU
alternatives to be parallel  to the case of visual experience. In one
case we form our beliefs on the basis of our visual experiences, in the
other case we form our belief on the basis of our agentive experience
about OU alternatives. 
Normally both the experiences and beliefs coincide and we might be
led to believe that they are the same, but as we have seen there are
cases where the two can diverge and thus we should refrain from
identifying the two.
Before defending a fallback position for my incompatibility argument
which  does  not  presuppose  the  existence  of  experiences  of  OU
alternatives, I address the question of the relation between agentive
experiences of OU alternatives and perceptual experiences.
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3.7 Are experiences of OU alternatives perceptual
experiences?
Although the question of whether experiences of OU alternatives are
nothing  but  perceptual  experiences  does  not  play  any  role  in  my
argument,  I  nevertheless  address  this  question  in  order  to  give  a
better  picture  of  my  view  on  the  nature  of  experiences  of  OU
alternatives.  In  what  follows  I  examine  the  possibility  of  reducing
agentive  experiences  about  OU  alternatives  to  perceptual
experiences. Let me begin by focussing on visual experience. Surely,
visual  experiences  play  an important  role  in  agentive  experiences
about  OU  alternatives.  What  alternatives  I  experience  to  have  is
obviously related to my visual experience of the situation I am in. Only
by visually experiencing that  I  am standing at  a crossroads,  I  can
experience the OU alternatives of taking the left or the right path. But
although our visual experience provides us with information about our
situation,  we  do  however  not  literally  visually  experience  the
alternatives.  Visually  experiencing  an  apple  and  having  the
experience  that  I  can  grab  the  apple  are  different  kinds  of
experiences.  It  seems true that  we cannot  have the experience of
being able to grab the apple without having a visual experience of the
apple, but it  would be too quick to want to reduce the experienced
action-possibility  of  being  able  to  grab  the  apple  to  the  visual
experience of perceiving the apple. I can have the visual experience
of an apple without having the experience that it is open and up to me
to grab the apple. For instance, the apple might be too far away from
me. It is thus not enough to visually perceive an apple in order to
have the experience of it being open and up to me to grab the apple.
So the question is: what further element do I need to experience in
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order  to  have  an  experience  of  an  OU  alternative?  The  ‘being
grabbable’ of  the apple  is  the  feature we  are trying to single  out.
Could it be (contrary to my first explanation above) that this feature
depends solely on my visual experience? 
An  interesting  hypothesis  is  that  whether  the  apple  is  visually
perceived  as  being  grabbable  by  me  depends  on  the  visually
perceived arrangement of the situation. It  is not enough to visually
perceive  the apple,  but  a  specific  arrangement  of  what  is  visually
perceived might be enough. In our case, the arrangement is such that
we visually perceive the apple to be close enough to be grabbed. In
order to reject the hypothesis that experiencing the apple as being
grabbable by me can be reduced to my visual experience, we need to
find  two  situations  which  are  visually  identical  for  which  the
experienced OU alternatives are not identical. I would like to provide
the following two situations. In both, I stand in front of an apple which
is close enough for me to grab it. In one situation, my hands are tied
behind my back and in the second situation I have my hands behind
my back but they are not tied. In both situations, I am unable to see
my hands.  Although the two  situations  are  visually  indiscernible,  I
claim that in the first situation I do not experience the OU alternative
of  grabbing  the  apple  because  I  experience  my hands  to  be tied
behind my back. In the second situation however, I do not experience
my hands to be tied and I do experience it to be open and up to me to
grab the apple in front of me. Thus, it seems not possible to reduce
agentive experiences about OU alternatives to visual experiences. 
If  this  case  is  not  convincing,  there  is  another  case  that  should
dissipate any remaining doubts about the rejection of the thesis that
agentive experiences about OU alternatives can be reduced to visual
experiences. Let us consider the case of an agent who closes her
eyes.  Does  she,  by  closing  her  eyes,  stop  experiencing  OU
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alternatives? This is clearly not the case. For instance, I experience
the situation I am in when I close my eyes to be such that I could
reopen my eyes. I also experience this situation to be such that it is
open and up to me to lift  my arm. In this  case it  not  only seems
misguided  to  try  to  reduce  the  agentive  experience  to  a  visual
experience, but in this case the visual perception is not even needed
to experience the OU alternative.
If  agentive  experiences  are  not  identical  with  visual  experiences
maybe they are  identical  with  combinations  of  different  perceptual
experiences (from different perceptual modes)? In the case where I
have my eyes closed, proprioception is likely to play a central role
about the alternatives given to me in that situation. Whether my arm
is already up or still  down is given to me by proprioception. In the
case of the apple in front of me, the difference might be in terms of
touch. In one case, I feel the rope on my skin, while I do not have
such a feeling in the second case. And so, maybe by taking all our
modes of perception into account we can come to the conclusion that
agentive  experiences  about  OU  alternatives  are  nothing  but
perceptual experiences. The motivation for such a claim comes from
the fact that our modes of perception, including proprioception, give
us information about the situation we are in. But do they thereby also
give us sufficient information about what alternatives are open and up
to us? 
In  the  above  discussion,  we  have  been  neglecting  an  important
feature of OU alternatives. We have only focussed on the external
features of the situation the agent is in, but not on the features which
are “internal” to the agent (i.e. psychological conditions). If the agent
has a strong apple-phobia which prevents her from grabbing apples,
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she will  not experience the alternative of grabbing the apple to be
open  and  up  to  her.  Whether  an  agent  has  such  a  hindering
psychological condition is ordinarily experientially given to the agent.
An  arachnophobic  who  sees  a  spider  does  not  need  to  find  out
whether she can touch the spider or not – it is present in the agent’s
experience. In order to reject that agentive experiences are reducible
to perceptual experiences we would have to exclude that the agent’s
experience  of  her  psychological  condition  is  perceptual.  I  have  to
leave  this  question  open  and  turn  now  to  another  aspect  of  the
agentive experience to which we have not been paying attention yet
either. 
In order for an alternative to be open and up to the agent, the agent
needs to have the corresponding ability (it must be in her power) to
realize the alternative and the situation the agent is in must be such
that she has the opportunity to exercise her ability (her power can
manifest  in  this  situation,  i.e.  she  can  exercise  her  power  in  this
situation). Whether an agent has the ability in question and whether
she is in a situation in which she has the opportunity to exercise this
ability is something which is ordinarily given to an agent in a more or
less reliable way. Surely there are cases, where it will not be obvious
to  an  agent,  whether  she  has  the  needed  ability  or  whether  the
situation is such that she has the opportunity to exercise her ability.
For instance, whether I have the ability to jump over an obstacle lying
in front of me, might be something which is not obvious to me. Even
assuming  that  I  experience  to  have  the  ability  to  jump  over  the
obstacle generally, it might nevertheless not be obvious, whether the
specific  situation  I  am  in  at  that  moment  is  such  that  I  can
successfully exercise my ability to do so (for instance, the soil is very
slippery, I have muscle ache, etc.). There are cases however where it
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seems clear to the agent that she has the ability in question and that
the situation  is  such that  she has the opportunity  to  exercise  her
ability. For instance, it is clearly given to me, that I have the ability and
that  I  can exercise the ability in  the situation I  am in to open the
drawer  of  my  desk,  to  stand  up,  to  close  my  eyes,  to  use  the
keyboard,  to  move  the  mouse  of  my  computer,  etc.  This  is  not
something I need to discover, but it is directly given to me. 
The question we need to address now, is whether having the relevant
ability and having the opportunity to exercise this ability are given to
me solely by perceptual experience. It seems doubtful, at least at first,
that sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, proprioception, thermoception,
nociception  and  equilibrioception  can  provide  me  with  this
information.  Obviously these modes can provide information about
the situation I am in. But do they also provide information about the
abilities that I have? 
One proposal that they do is the following one. Our experience of our
abilities is reducible to former perceptions of our actions in different
past  situations.  Having perceived successes or failures of  different
past actions we have gained access to what abilities we have and to
which situations we can exercise these abilities in. In this sense what
abilities  we  have  is  given  to  us  by  perception.  Obviously,  the
experience cannot be based solely on past perception, but is also
based on the current perception of the situation. Combining both past
and  current  perception  we  might  have  found  the  basis  for  the
agentive experience of OU alternatives. 
Given the reduction question of agentive experiences plays no direct
role for my incompatibility argument I have to set this question aside
for the remaining of this work. 
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3.8 Fallback  position:  A  deeply  entrenched
doxastic state about OU alternatives
In  this  section,  I  provide  a  fallback  position  for  my incompatibility
argument which does not  rely on the presupposition that  we have
experiences of the type described above. This proposal might appeal
to philosophers who deny that experiences have contents which can
be assessed for veridicality.38 These philosophers might claim that in
the case of a Müller-Lyer case we do not experience the lines to be of
different length either. We merely have some sort of belief that they
are  of  different  length  (which is  based on the experience).  It  is  a
consequence of this position, that in a Müller-Lyer scenario an agent
holds  conflicting  beliefs.  On the one hand,  the  agent  believes the
lines  to  be  of  the  same  length  and  at  the  same  time  the  agent
believes the lines to be of different length. This is peculiar, especially
if  the agent also believes the first belief to be true and the second
belief  to  be  false.  One  way  out  of  this  difficulty,  which  does  not
necessitate the presupposition of experiential content, is to argue that
the latter is not a normal belief but a different type of doxastic state
very similar to beliefs. Let us call these states proto-beliefs or aliefs39.
What is characteristic of these doxastic states is that they are deeply
entrenched  in  the  agent's  nature.  Even  in  the  light  of  convincing
38 For an overview on the question whether experiences have accuracy or
veridicality conditions see Siegel (2015).
39 The notion of 'alief'  has been introduced by Tamar Gendler to explain
belief-discordant behaviour. Although an agent beliefs something to be
true, she does not act accordingly. This can be explained by the agent's
aliefs. Cf. Gendler (2008).
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contrary evidence the agent does not stop being in this doxastic state.
No matter how convincing the evidence that the two lines are of the
same length, we continue to be in this doxastic state with the content
that the lines are of different length.40 
It is possible to defend my incompatibility argument on the basis of
such a doxastic account without having to presuppose the existence
of  experiences of  OU alternatives.  All  that  is  needed are  doxastic
states (different from ordinary beliefs) –  which are deeply entrenched
in our nature – such that it seems to us that we do have (at least) two
OU alternatives in  situations of  choice.  As in  the Müller-Lyer  case
where we cannot get rid of the doxastic state that the lines are of
different  length  by believing that  they are  of  the  same length,  we
cannot  get  rid  of  the  doxastic  state  that  we  have  the  two  OU
alternatives.  Even  if  we  believe  determinism  to  be  true,  we
nevertheless do not lose the doxastic state that we have the two OU
alternatives. Under the assumption of determinism we are subject to
a systematic illusion about what alternatives are open and up to us. 
The  argument  based  on  these  doxastic  states  parallel  to  my
argument for experience of OU alternatives is thus the following:
(1D) In a situation of choice, the agent is in a doxastic state (deeply
entrenched in the agent's nature) such that it seems to her that she
has at least two OU alternatives.
40 Note that the Müller-Lyer illusion might be susceptible to the environment
and culture a subject has grown up in. For a discussion of this topic see
for instance McCauley & Henrich (2006).
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(2D) The doxastic state of having two OU alternatives is veridical (i.e.
corresponds to the way the world is) if and only if the alternatives are
open  and  up  to  the  agent.  The  doxastic  state  of  having  two  OU
alternatives is illusory (i.e. is in conflict with the way the world is) if
and only if one or more of the alternatives fails to be open and up to
the agent.
(3D) An alternative is an  OU alternative (i.e. is open and up to the
agent) only if there exists an extension of the situation of choice such
that the agent realizes the alternative in that extension.
(4D) In order for a doxastic state of choice to be veridical, there must,
for every OU alternative A which is part of the doxastic state of the
agent41, exist an extension of the actual situation of choice such that
the OU alternative A is realized in that extension.
(5D) There is no single action an agent can do to realize more than
one of the OU alternatives which is part of the doxastic state of the
agent, i.e. the realization of OU alternatives is mutually exclusive.
(6D) Nomological determinism is true.
(7D) There exists only one extension (in the future) of a situation of
choice.
(8D)  Under  the  assumption  of  nomological  determinism,  doxastic
41  An OU alternative A is part of a doxastic state of an agent if and only if
she is in a doxastic state such that it seems to her that she has the OU
alternative A.
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states  of  choice  cannot  be  veridical  and  are  thus  systematically
illusory.
Note that my incompatibility argument about the experience of OU
alternatives and this type of fallback position about doxastic states
about  OU  alternatives  allow  to  accommodate  our  experience  or
doxastic  state  with  the  belief  about  the  truth  of  determinism.
According  to  these  arguments  the  belief  in  determinism  is  not  in
conflict  with  the  experience  or  doxastic  state  of  having  two  OU
alternatives. All that needs to be accepted is that this experience or
doxastic  state  is  systematically  illusory.  Ideally,  what  needs  to  be
added for such a position is an error theory explaining this systematic
illusion. 
One might be tempted to defend an argument similar to the one I
defended  above  (which  does  however  not  presuppose  a  doxastic
state different from belief) which argues for the falsity of determinism.
It states that our beliefs about OU alternatives are in conflict with the
truth of determinism. It then continues by arguing that our beliefs in
OU alternatives are essential to our understanding of ourselves (or
something along these lines) and that we should thus reject the thesis
of determinism. Although I do not want to defend such an argument
here, I provide a sketch for such an argument in the section below.
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3.9 An  argument  based  solely  on  beliefs  about
OU alternatives
In  this  section  I  sketch  an argument  with  parallel  structure  to  my
incompatibility  argument  which  defends  that  the  belief  in  OU
alternatives is in conflict with the belief in the truth of determinism and
that we should thus give up the thesis of determinism. 
(1B) When an agent believes to have a choice, she believes to have
at least two OU alternatives, i.e. she believes to have two alternatives
which are open and up to her.
(2B)  The  belief  to  have  a  choice  is  true  if  and  only  if  all  the
alternatives the agent beliefs to have are open and up to the agent.
The belief to have a choice is false if and only if one or more of the
OU alternatives the agent believes to have fail to be open and up to
the agent.
(3B) An alternative is open and up to the agent only if there exists an
extension of the situation of choice such that the agent realizes the
alternative in that extension.
(4B) In order for the belief of having a choice to be true, there must,
for  every  OU  alternative  A the  agent  believes  to  have,  exist  an
extension  of  the  actual  situation  of  choice  such  that  the  OU
alternative A is realized in that extension.
(5B) There exists no single action an agent can do in order to realize
more than one of the OU alternatives she believes to have, i.e. the
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realization of OU alternatives is mutually exclusive.
(6B) Nomological determinism is true.
(7B) There exists only one extension (in the future) of a situation of
choice.
(8B) Under the assumption of (nomological) determinism, the belief of
having a choice turns out to be systematically false.
At this stage it is possible to add a premise about the importance of
the belief in OU alternatives. E.g. one could defend:
(9B) It is not possible for an agent to give up the belief that she has
(at least) two OU alternatives because it constitutes an essential part
of  our  understanding  of  our  human  nature  to  be  able  to  choose
between OU alternatives.
Which  allows  to  then  draw  the  conclusion  that  the  thesis  of
determinism must be false.
(10B) The assumption of (nomological) determinism has to be given
up.
Obviously, if somebody has strong theoretical reasons to believe in
the  truth  of  determinism,  she  might  defend  the  following  type  of
premise instead of (9B):
(9B')  The  truth  of  thesis  of  determinism  is  essential  for  our
understanding of the world.
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And thus conclude:
(10B')  Our  beliefs  about  having OU alternatives  are systematically
false and should be rejected.
I  consider it  to be a strength of my incompatibility argument about
experiences  of  OU  alternatives  (or  doxastic  states  about  OU
alternatives)  that  it  does  not  force  us  to  take  a  definite  stance
between the thesis of determinism and the OU alternatives which are
given to us. 
On the one hand, it allows those who have strong reasons to defend
the  truth  of  determinism  to  acknowledge  the  deeply  entrenched
character  of  OU alternatives  which  turns  out  to  be  systematically
illusory, but cannot be given up. 
On the other hand, it can also accommodate the thesis that unless we
have very strong reasons to believe in the truth of determinism, we
should rather believe in its falsity in order to avoid having to attribute
us  a  systematic  illusion  in  our  deeply  entrenched  experience  of
choice.
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4 Discussing some cases
4.1 Introduction
The four cases presented in this chapter challenge my analysis of the
experiences of OU alternatives and their veridicality conditions. The
replies  to  these  cases  allow me to  clarify  my view and  defend  a
distinction between different types of alternatives.
4.2 Motherly love
Let me start with a case which is intended to challenge the necessary
requirement  for  the veridicality of  experiences of  OU alternatives I
defend in my incompatibility argument.  I  argue that in order for an
experience of an OU alternative to be veridical there must exist an
extension of the situation the agent is in such that the agent realizes
the alternative in that extension. If we find a case such that we judge
that the agent has an OU alternative, but there is no extension of the
situation such that she realizes that alternative, then we have found a
counterexample  to  reject  the  defended  necessary  condition.  One
such potential counterexample is a case about a mother who is in the
situation of being able to save her child without endangering herself
or having to fear any other negative consequence. The mother is on a
walk at the lake with her young child. Her child sees a duck swimming
and starts running towards the duck. The child trips and falls into the
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lake. The water is deep and the child has never learned to swim. The
mother, who is a good swimmer, immediately jumps into the lake and
saves her child. 
Such a case is a counterexample to my proposal, if (1) the case is
such that the mother had the experience that not jumping into the
lake  in  order  to  save  the  child  was  open  and  up  to  her,  (2)  this
experience is veridical, i.e. the alternative was in fact open and up to
her and yet (3) there exists no extension of the situation in which the
mother does not jump into the lake to save her child and thus the
condition I defend to be necessary is not necessary. 
Why should we think that there exists no such extension? If we keep
the  situation  and  the  laws  of  nature  (thus  also  the  mother-love,
swimming-abilities and rationality of the agent) fixed, there exists no
possible world (which fulfils the fixity of the situation and of the laws of
nature) such that the mother does not jump into the lake to save her
child. In order for the agent not to jump, she would need to become
crazy (or another important change of the situation would need to be
realized) and this is contrary to our requirement to hold the situation
and laws of nature fixed. If this is correct, we have a case of an agent
who has the veridical experience of an alternative of not saving the
child being open and up to her, yet there exists no extension of the
situation in which the agent does not save the child.
I would like to start by raising a doubt about the assumption that the
mother has the experience of the OU alternative of not jumping into
the lake. It  is unlikely that when a mother sees her child drowning
there is in any sense an alternative given to her that she could refrain
from trying to save her child. However, for the sake of the argument, I
will  grant  that  the  case  is  such  that  the  agent  does  have  the
experience of such an OU alternative. But in order for this case to be
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a counterexample, the agent  does not only need to have such an
experience, but it also needs to be veridical, i.e. it must be open and
up to the agent not to save her child. But as we have seen above, the
mother would need to become crazy (or some other important change
would need to be realized) in order for the agent not to save the child.
How could somebody insist that it is open and up to the mother not to
save her child if she had to become crazy in order to do so? 
One reason why somebody could insist that it is open and up to her
not to save the child, is that she has the general ability not to jump
into the lake. And in this sense, it seems true that she could refrain
from jumping into the lake. While I obviously grant that the agent has
this  general  ability to  refrain from jumping into the lake,  I  want  to
resist that she has the specific ability not to jump into the lake to save
her child in the very situation she is in at that moment.  Given her
constitution (psychological and physical), it is impossible for her not to
save her child in the situation she is in at that moment. We need to
distinguish between two different senses about what an agent can do.
On the one hand, an agent can do whatever she has the general
ability to do. On the other hand, an agent can just do whatever she
has the specific ability to do in the situation she is in at that moment.
In  the  latter  sense,  the  agent  can  only  do  whatever  she  has  the
opportunity to do in  that  very situation.  And as I  argued above,  in
order for an alternative to be open and up to the agent, the agent
needs  to  have  this  kind  of  special  ability  or  opportunity.  I  further
argued above,  that  in  order  for  the agent  to  have such a specific
ability or opportunity, there must exist an extension of the situation
such  that  the  agent  realizes  that  alternative  in  that  extension.  By
using this distinction, we can grant that there is a sense in which the
agent could not have saved the child, although it was not open and
up to the mother not to save her child.
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A similar way to formulate the above worry is in terms of the agent’s
causal powers. The claim would be that while there is no extension of
the situation such that  the agent  does not  jump into the lake,  the
agent nevertheless had the causal power to refrain from jumping into
the lake. My reply to this kind of formulation is parallel to the reply
above. I defend the claim that an alternative is open and up to the
agent only if the situation is such that her causal power can manifest
in that situation, i.e. only if she can exercise her causal power in that
situation. Thus although the agent has the causal power of refraining
of jumping into the lake, she is not in a situation in which she can
exercise this causal power. 
It  is possible to  use the locution of 'having a causal power'  just to
cover the cases where one has the opportunity to exercise the causal
power. If somebody is not in a situation in which she can exercise her
causal power,  she does not  have the causal power.  However,  this
alternate use of 'causal powers' has no influence on my argument. A
defender of such a position would have to grant that according to her
definition the mother fails to have the causal power to refrain from
jumping into the lake in the situation in which her child is drowning. 
4.3 Criminal Threat
I  argue  above  that  it  is  unlikely  that  the  mother  actually  has  the
experience of the OU alternative of not saving her child. But there is a
case with many parallels to the case above where it is quite likely that
the agent does have such a type of experience. Take the case of an
agent who is threatened by a criminal with a gun. The criminal tells
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the agent what to do and threatens to kill the agent if she does not do
what the criminal asks her to do. In such a case it is quite probable
that the alternative of not doing what the criminal is asking is given to
the agent in her experience as an OU alternative. It seems open and
up to her to refrain from doing what the criminal is asking her to do. 
But is this case more problematic than the case above? Remember
that for this case to be a counterexample, we need to judge that the
agent’s experience is veridical, i.e. it is open and up to the agent not
to follow the criminal’s orders and at the same time we must judge
that there is no extension of the situation in which the agent does not
follow the criminal’s orders. In order to answer this challenge we need
to  add  specifications  to  the  case.  And  depending  on  the  way  we
specify our scenario, I argue that either the experience is illusory and
there is no extension of the situation such that the agent does not
follow the criminal’s orders or the experience is veridical and there is
an extension of the situation such that the agent does not follow the
criminal’s orders. Whether the first or the second kind of scenario is
realized depends on the specification of the situation and thus also on
the  constitution  (physical  and  psychological)  of  the  agent.  For
instance, if the criminal orders the agent to press a button which will
result in the death of ten people, the agent might be psychologically
constituted  in  such  a  way  that,  because  of  her  urge  of  self-
preservation,  she  could  not  refrain  from  pressing  the  button.
Alternatively the agent could be such that it is both open and up to
her to press or refrain from pressing the button. Or she might be such
that  she  cannot  press  the  button,  because  her  psychological
constitution  is  such  that  she  cannot  kill  people.  If  we  keep  the
ambiguity in  mind about  what  an agent  can do (which we already
encountered  in  the  motherly  love  case),  then  none  of  those
possibilities turn out to be problematic for my claims. In every case,
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what is open and up to the agent depends on the existence of an
extension  of  the  agent's  situation  such  that  she  realizes  the
alternative in that extension.
Note that  this  case also shows that  we might  have a very salient
experience of an OU alternative which turns out to be illusory. It is
quite  probable  that  somebody  being  threatened  still  has  the
experience of the OU alternative of not following the criminal's order
(e.g. give the criminal her money), although it is not open and up to
her to refrain from following the criminal's order because she would
need to become crazy,  much more courageous,  selfless,  etc.  then
she actually is in order to refrain from following the criminal’s order.42 
What can we conclude from the fact that there are cases where we
have a prominent experience that turns out to be illusory? We should
not be surprised. We are all  familiar with cases of optical illusions.
There is no prima facie reason to believe that this should be different
in the case of agentive experiences. But most importantly, we should
not confuse singular cases of illusions with systematic illusions. Even
if we are prone to optic illusions we do not conclude that our visual
perception  is  completely  unreliable.  There  is  no  reason  to  react
differently with cases of illusory agentive experiences. 
42 Note that I am hereby not saying that somebody cannot become more
courageous or selfless – whatever that exactly means – but that whether
it is open and up to the agent to become more courageous or selfless
depends on her actual constitution and the situation she is in.
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4.4 The Gambling Mathematician
The  next  case  I  want  to  discuss,  is  the  case  of  a  gambling
mathematician. She can either bet on black or red and has calculated
that betting on black gives her a 60% winning chance while betting on
red only gives her a 40% chance. We can safely assume that the
mathematician will act according to her best judgement and will thus
bet on black. At the same time, she has the experience that she has
the OU alternative to bet on red. The situation also seems to be such
that she has the opportunity and special ability to bet on red in the
very situation she is in. Nothing seems to prevent her from exercising
her causal power of betting on red. If this is correct, then this case
turns out to be a counterexample if  it  is  also true that there is no
extension of her situation of choice such that she bets on red. There
seem to be good reasons to believe that there is in fact no possible
extension of her situation in which she bets on red. She has come to
the conclusion, that betting on black is the better solution. She is not
crazy and there is no reason to presume that it is open and up to her
to act crazily. In other words, we should be able to safely assume that
holding her  situation and the laws of  nature fixed,  she will  bet  on
black.  However,  whether  this  is  the  case  depends  on  the  further
specification of  the case.  If  on the one hand the mathematician is
such that under no circumstances she could bet other than what she
has calculated, then there is in fact no extension of the situation in
which she does bet on red. And thus, if she has the experience of the
OU alternative of betting on red, then her experience is illusory. If on
the other hand her psychological condition does not prevent her from
betting  on red,  but  does allow her  to  do bet  on red,  for  instance,
simply because she sometimes “acts on a hunch”, i.e. she sometimes
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acts on a feeling which is against her best mathematical judgement,
then  it  turns  out  that  there  exists  an  extension  where  the
mathematician bets on red and thus her experience that it  is open
and up to her to be on red is veridical. 
Note that I am in no way implying that for our analysis we need to
look at situations different from the one our agent is in. My proposal is
not to look at a world in which we replace the agent’s reasons and
motivation by different reasons and motivations. My suggestion is that
the  current  situation  the  agent  is  in  (according  to  the  second
specification of  the case) is such that it  is  open and up to her on
which reasons (which are available to her in this very situation) she
wants  to  act  upon.  Either  she  follows  her  mathematically  best
judgement  or  she acts  on  the  hunch.  There  is  nothing  in  the
psychology of the mathematician in the second specification of the
case that prevents her from doing the latter. It is not impossible for the
mathematician to bet on red, because it is open and up to her to act
on a reason other than her best mathematical judgement.
4.5 The Teaching Professor
This case is about a professor at breakfast deliberating about whether
to give her lecture which will start soon after her breakfast. It seems
to her that it is both open to her to go give her lecture or to stay at
home. Further, it is clear to her that under the given circumstances
she will give her lecture. She loves her job, loves teaching and she
has no extraordinary reason not to give the lecture (e.g. somebody in
her family just had a terrible accident). I grant that this is a case with
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no extension of the situation such that she does not give her lecture.
At the same time, the professor might have the experience that it is
open to her not  to go give the lecture and we might  consider this
experience  to  be  veridical.  If  this  is  correct,  we  have  found  a
counterexample to my proposal.  And if  this case turns out to be a
counterexample, we end up with a large list of counterexamples. All
cases in which the psychology and situation of an agent is such that it
is clear what she is going to do and the agent still has the experience
(which we judge to be veridical) that doing something different is open
and  up  to  her  would  all  turn  out  to  be  counterexamples  to  my
argument. But is the treatment of these cases really correct?
I do not want to deny that there are cases like the present one for
which there is no possible continuation of the situation such that the
agent does something different then what she actually is going to do
(as we have just seen in e.g. the motherly love case). In order for the
agent to act differently something about these situations would have
to be different – either an external condition or the psychological state
of the agent. Further, I do not want to deny, that there is a sense in
which the agent  has  the veridical  experience of  being able  to act
differently. 
What I want to deny however is, that the professor's experience of not
giving the lecture is an experience of an OU alternative. I claim that
the agent does not experience the alternative as open and up to her
given the situation she is in at that moment. In fact, it is clear to her
that she will  not realize that alternative.  She even experiences the
alternative  of  not  giving  the  lecture  to  be  incompatible  with  the
situation (especially her psychological state) she is in at that moment.
For the professor, it is clear that she will give her lecture. Not giving
the lecture is not realizable by her in this situation because of her
current psychological state (and the current situation in general) and
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this is given to the agent in her experience. In this sense she does not
experience not giving the course as an OU alternative. So in what
sense does she have a veridical experience that she could not give
the course?
Again, we need to apply the distinction between having the ability to
do something and being in a situation in which we can exercise that
ability or having the opportunity to exercise that ability. The professor
obviously has the ability not to give her lecture. But given the situation
she  is  in,  including  her  psychological  state  and  the  external
conditions,  it  is  impossible  for  her  to  exercise  that  ability  in  that
situation.  When the agent  experiences that  she could refrain from
giving the lecture, she experiences that she has the ability not to give
the  lecture.  In  this  sense,  her  experience  is  veridical.  But  this
experience is not an experience of the OU alternative of not giving the
lecture.  She  experiences  her  situation  and  especially  her
psychological state to be such that she will give the lecture unless the
situation  changes.  Although  both  are  experiences  about  what  the
agent can do, they are two different types of experiences. 
A  similar  case  to  illustrate  this  distinction  is  the  following  one.
Somebody hands me a gun, explains to me how to use it and asks
me whether I experience it to be an open alternative to kill a friend
with this weapon. We have here two possible interpretations of this
question. Either the question is about whether I have the experience
of  having  the  ability  to  use  the  weapon  or  the  question  is  about
whether I experience the situation to be such that it is open and up to
me to use the weapon in the situation I am in. While I do have the
experience that I have the ability to use the gun it also is given to me
that it is not open and up to me to do so in this situation. I experience
it to be psychologically impossible for me to do so. If I experience an
action to be psychologically impossible in a situation, then I do not
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have the experience of the OU alternative of doing that action.
Let us return to the professor case. What if the professor does not
experience her psychological state to be such that it is impossible for
her not to give the lecture and experiences the situation to be such
that it is open and up to her not to give the lecture, but in fact her
psychological state is such that it is impossible for her not to give the
course? This would be a case of illusion. Although it seems open and
up to her to not give the lecture it is in fact not open and up to her to
give the lecture. There is no extension of the situation in which she
realizes that alternative. As I have argued above, it is not a problem
for  my proposal  to  grant  that  there  are  cases where agents  have
illusory  agentive  experiences.  These  cases  are  no  different  from
cases of perceptual illusion.
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5 Can-claims and OU alternatives
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, I discuss an argument by John Martin Fischer which
he calls the basic version of  the argument for  incompatibilism. My
incompatibility argument is very similar to his argument, but there are
some important differences which I highlight in order to clarify my own
argument.  Section  5.2 presents  Fischer's  basic  version  of  the
argument for incompatibilism and points to some peculiarities which
this argument involves. Section 5.3 shows how my position is able to
avoid the peculiarities which Fischer's argument needs to accept. The
crucial difference is that I argue that there are actions which an agent
can do although the alternative is not open and up to her. That is, I
reject the premise which Fischer accepts for the basic version of the
argument  that  an  agent  can  do  only  what  is  an  extension  of  her
current situation. Section 5.4 discusses these can-claims without OU
alternatives.  The  intuitive  point  which  I  attempt  to  capture  is,  that
when only reasons prevent somebody from doing something,  such
that it is not open and up to them to act accordingly, it is nevertheless
correct to make the corresponding can-claim. These cases are to be
distinguished  from  cases  where  an  agent  cannot  do  something
because of internal or external constraints which do not depend on
the rational  evaluation of  the situation by the agent.  But  they also
need to be distinguished from cases in which an agent has an OU
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alternative.43 
5.2 Fischer’s  basic  version  of  the  argument  for
incompatibilism
In his seminal book The Metaphysics of Free Will (1994), John Martin
Fischer presents an argument for incompatibilism which he calls the
‘Basic  Version  of  the  Argument  for  Incompatibilism’.  My
incompatibilism argument  has  many similarities  with  Fischer’s,  yet
there are some important differences which I discuss in the present
chapter. The kernel of Fischer’s argument is that an agent can only
do what is an extension of the actual past: “[A]n agent can in world w
do X only if his doing X can be an extension of the past in w holding
the natural laws of w fixed.” (Fischer 1994, p. 231)
Fischer presents the following argument: (1) Let us assume the truth
of causal determinism. (2) Agent A mows the lawn at t2. (3) Because
of  the  truth of  causal  determinism,  there is  an earlier  state of  the
world s1 at t1 before t2 where s1 together with the laws of nature
entail that A mows the lawn at t2. (4) Thus, the only extension of the
actual past at t1 is one in which A mows the lawn at t2. (5) Supposing
that an agent  can only do something which is an extension of the
actual past, the agent can thus not refrain from mowing the lawn at t2,
because A’s refraining from mowing the lawn at t2 is not an extension
43 According  to  my view,  the  set  of  OU alternatives  is  a  subset  of  the
actions an agent can do.
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of the actual past. (6) Thus, A cannot refrain from mowing the lawn at
t2.44
Fischer  continues  his  argumentation  by  suggesting  that  the
incompatibilist  defending this  argument  can also  grant  the truth of
certain  backtracking  conditionals  in  order  to  accommodate  the
compatibilist intuition that something would have had to be different
for  the  agent  to  have  acted  differently.  The  key-point  in  Fischer’s
argumentation  to  accommodate  both  the  incompatibilist  and
compatibilist intuitions is to defend that the assessment of the can-
claim and the backtracking conditional have to be done differently. On
the one hand,  the  former  must  be evaluated  by holding  fixed  the
actual past, while on the other hand, the actual past needs not to be
held fixed in order to evaluate the latter. “This shift in the conditions of
assessment of the two claims renders them [i.e. the can-claim and
the backtracking conditional] compatible” (Fischer 1994, p. 90). Let us
look at Fischer’s ‘Salty Old Seadog’ case:
“Consider the salty old seadog. Each morning at 9:00 a.m. (for the
past forty years) he has called the weather service to ascertain the
weather at noon. If the “weatherman” says at 9:00 that the weather
will be fair at noon, the seadog always goes sailing at noon. And if the
44 Recently, a similar argument has been defended by Christopher Franklin
(2011).  Franklin  defends  the  view  that  while  determinism  does  not
threaten our ability to do otherwise,  it  threatens our opportunity to do
otherwise. Franklin uses the following definition of opportunity:
“(O*) S has the opportunity to φ at t in W iff there is a possible world W*
in which S φs at t and, at the very least, everything except S's φ-ing, and
the causal consquences of her φ-ing, is the same as in W.” (Franklin
2011, p. 697)
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weatherman says that the weather won’t be fair at noon, the seadog
never goes sailing at noon. The seadog has certain extremely regular
patterns of behaviour and stable psychological dispositions – he is
careful to find out the weather forecast, is not forgetful, confused, or
psychologically  erratic,  and  whereas  he  loves  to  go  sailing  in
sunshine, he detests sailing in bad weather.
Further,  let  us  not  make any assumptions  about  God’s  existence.
Also, assume that causal determinism does not obtain. That is, let us
imagine that various factors (values, desires, beliefs, etc.) explain or
rationalize  the  seadog’s  choices  and  actions,  but  do  not  causally
determine them.  (We  may  even  assume  that  there  is  universal
causation without its being deterministic causation.)
It  is  now  noon,  and  at  9:00  this  morning  the  seadog  called  the
weather service and was told that the weather at noon (and after)
would be horrible, that there would be torrential rains. The seadog is
healthy and alert, and his sailboat ready to go. Bearing in mind the
weather forecast, he decides at noon not to go sailing. But can he at
noon go sailing this afternoon? Given that the seadog is not coerced,
hypnotized,  manipulated  electronically,  deceived,  etc.  (and  causal
determinism  is  false),  it  seems  that  the  seadog  certainly  can  go
sailing at noon. He simply  doesn’t go sailing at noon: he makes a
rational choice not to do something which he, nevertheless, has the
power to do. He has the freedom, as it were, to be crazy (or at least
to act crazily).” (Fischer 1994, p. 80f, original italics)
According to Fischer, the incompatibilist should not only argue for the
claim that the seadog can go sailing at noon, but she should also
grant  that  at  least  one  of  the  two  following  corresponding
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backtracking conditionals is true45:
“(C1) If the seadog were to go sailing at noon, then the weatherman
would have told him at 9:00 that the weather would be fair at noon.”
(Fischer 1994, p. 81)
“(C2) If the seadog were to go sailing at noon, then some fact about
some time prior to noon would not have been a fact.” (Fischer 1994,
p. 81, original italics)
I agree with Fischer that these sentences are plausibly true. (C1) and
(C2) are accurate descriptions of the seadog’s habits. At the same
time, it would be puzzling to deny that the seadog cannot go sailing at
noon. 
Fischer  argues that  we  should  grant  the  truth  of  the  backtracking
conditionals (C1) and/or (C2) because the possible world where the
seadog goes sailing at noon which is closest or most similar to the
actual  world  (where  the  agent  decides  on  the  basis  of  the  bad
weather-forecast  not  to  go  sailing  at  noon)  is  one  in  which  the
weather is fair (or some other fact of the actual past does not obtain).
This seems quite plausible. But when Fischer adds that the seadog
can go sailing at noon in spite of the bad weather, he claims it on the
basis of the assumption that there is an extension of the actual past
(with the bad weather forecast) in which the seadog goes sailing at
noon. This gives us the quite astonishing result that a world with facts
45 Note  that  Fischer  does  not  consider  the  truth  of  the  backtracking
conditionals to be evident: “[I]t would be inappropriate to think that the
backtrackers  are  uncontroversially  true.”  (Fischer  1994,  p.82,  original
italics)
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that differ  from the facts of the actual world is more similar  to the
actual world than a world which is identical to the actual world up until
the moment  of  the seadog’s decision  (which does not  involve any
breach of the actual laws of nature) to go sailing at noon in spite of
the bad weather.46 
Fischer’s  solution involves  accepting another  peculiarity.  When the
seadog deliberates about what to do, it seems reasonable to claim
that he believes that if he were to go sailing (now), he’d be sailing in
bad weather conditions. Should somebody ask the seadog how the
weather will be, if he were to go sailing now, he’d surely reply that he
believes – on the basis of the weather-forecast – that the weather is
going to be bad. This belief reflects the fact that given that his going
sailing or not has no influence on whether the weather is good or bad,
we should also accept that if he were to go sailing now, the weather
46 Fischer  is  aware  of  this  point:  “Of  course,  in  order  for  them  to  be
consistent, it must be the case that the possible world w posited by the
analysis of the can-claim is not in the set of possible worlds in which the
seadog goes sailing at noon which are most similar to the actual world.”
(Fischer 1994, p. 91, original italics) And grants in a footnote that he is
not able to give a reason for this peculiarity: “I have not  argued that in
analyzing  the  “can”  of  freedom  (as  opposed  to  the  subjunctive
conditional) one looks at worlds that are merely suitably related to the
actual world but not necessarily in the set of the most similar worlds. I
am not sure how exactly to argue for this; it does seem to emerge from a
consideration  of  examples  and  the  possible-worlds  framework  for
analyzing the examples that the worlds relevant to the can-claim need
not be among the most similar possible worlds. I ask the reader to take it
as a  plausible  supposition,  and in  part  to  test  it  by its  fruitfulness in
illuminating the cases to which I apply it.” (Fischer 1994, p. 232, original
italics)
84
The Phenomenology of Choice
would be bad. But Fischer argues for the truth of the backtracking
conditional that if he were to go sailing, the weather would be fair (or
some other fact of the actual past would not obtain). This leads to a
puzzling situation. On the one side, it seems that (D1) it is true that if
he were to go sailing now, the weather would be bad. On the other
side, (D2) it is true that if the seadog were to go sailing at noon, the
weather would be fair (or some other fact of the actual past would not
obtain).  Note  that  (D1)  and  (D2)  together  do  not  yet  result  in  a
contradiction.  Both  (D1)  and  (D2)  are  implications  with  the  same
antecedent  and  conflicting  consequences.  But  as  long  as  the
antecedent does not obtain we do not get a contradiction. It might be
impossible for the antecedent to obtain. But given that Fischer argues
that there is an extension of the actual situation in which the seadog
goes  sailing  at  noon,  it  becomes  puzzling  how  to  avoid  the
contradictory conclusion that the weather is both bad and fair (in this
situation were the seadog goes sailing at noon).
However, Fischer never discusses the truth of (D1) in his argument.
All  Fischer says is  that  the can-claim is  true,  because there is an
extension of  the actual  past  such that  the  seadog goes sailing  at
noon. The reasoning that led me to accepting the truth of (D1) might
thus be rejected by Fischer. He might argue that it is erroneous for
the seadog to believe that if he were to go sailing now, the weather
would be bad. Rather, he should believe that if he were to go sailing
now, the weather would be fair (or some other fact of the actual past
would not be a fact). To me it seems counterintuitive to think that the
seadog does not believe (D1) to be true. He knows that he has no
influence on the weather and thinks that he can go sailing at noon.
Another possibility to interpret Fischer’s compatibility claim between
the  can-claim  and  the  backtracking  conditionals  is  to  argue  that
depending on the interests of the evaluator of the sentences either
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(D1) or (D2) turns out to be true and the other false, and vice versa.
This fits Fischer’s suggestion that in deliberation an agent should only
take into consideration extensions of the actual past.47 
5.3 Accepting both can-claims and backtracking
conditionals
In what follows, I do not attempt to prove that Fischer’s proposal does
not work, rather I want to suggest a solution which does not rely on
Fischer’s  shift  in  the  conditions  of  assessment.  That  is,  I  aim  to
explain how both the can-claim and the backtracking conditionals are
true simpliciter (i.e. without any shift in the conditions of assessment).
My solution is grounded in  the  ambiguity of can-claims. On the one
side, a can-claim can be about the abilities of an agent, on the other
side,  a can-claim can be about  an opportunity  an agent  has  in  a
specific situation. Further, I consider the backtracking conditionals to
be true because they accurately describe the seadog's character.
My solution to the Salty Old Seadog case consists in the claim that
the can in ‘the seadog can go sailing at noon’ is a can of ability and
not a can of opportunity. According to my terminology, we should thus
grant that the seadog can go sailing at noon, but we should deny that
the seadog has the OU alternative of going sailing at noon. In fact, we
47 That is, when the seadog is deliberating, (D1) turns out to be true and
(D2) turns out to be false. In other contexts of assessment (D2) is true
and (D1) is false. The topic of deliberation is treated in chapter 6.
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do  have  very  good  reasons  to  deny  that  the  seadog  has  an  OU
alternative  of  going sailing  at  noon.  His  character  is  such that  he
hates sailing in bad weather.  Something about him or the situation
would need to be different for him to go sailing at noon. Thus, given
the actual situation and its past, there is no extension of the actual
situation such that he goes sailing at noon. And if there is no such
extension, then he does not have the OU alternative of going sailing.
Nevertheless, we should not conclude from this fact that the seadog
cannot go sailing. In fact, the seadog does have the (general) ability
to go sailing. The truth of this ability is grounded in situations which
the seadog goes sailing at noon which are close enough to the actual
situation. That is, situations where the weather forecast was good or
in which he has a reason to go sailing in bad weather (e.g. rescuing
somebody).  In  other  words,  I  defend  the  position  that  the
incompatibilist  should  accept  the  compatibilist  intuition  that  the
seadog can go sailing at noon and that the backtracker is true that if
the seadog were to go sailing at noon, some fact of the actual past
would not have been a fact. Further, I agree with the compatibilist that
there is no extension of the actual situation in which the seadog goes
sailing at noon.
On the basis of this discussion of the Salty Old Seadog case four
important points  about my view concerning OU alternatives can be
highlighted. First, the incompatibilist intuition about OU alternatives I
defend is not about an agent having OU alternatives to act crazily or
out of character. All my argument tries to establish is that based on
experiences of choice there are situations of choice where an agent
has more than one OU alternative (if the experiences are veridical).
Those OU alternatives do not require the agent to act out of character
or crazily. 
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Second, there are true can-claims about agents who do not have the
corresponding OU-alternative. 
Third, there are cases where agents suffer from illusions about which
alternatives  are  open  and  up  to  them.  Suppose  that  the  seadog
experiences to have the OU alternative of sailing at noon. (Note that it
is quite unlikely that he has in fact such an experience,  see below.)
According to  my suggested  treatment  of  the  case,  his  experience
turns out to be illusory, because there is no extension of the situation
in which he acts crazily or out of character. 
This  brings  us  to  a  fourth  point:  Agents  have  (at  least  at  times)
experiential access to the distinction between which actions are open
and up to them and for which actions they merely have the general
ability. Although the seadog experiences to have the general ability to
go sailing he does not experience to have the OU alternative to go
sailing  right  now.  The  seadog  is  likely  to  have  access  to  his
psychological  state which is  such that  sailing in  bad weather is  in
stark contrast with his preferences and thus he would not experience
it as open and up to him to go sailing at noon. 
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5.4 Constrained by reasons:  Refinement  of  can-
claims about alternatives which are not open
and up to the agent
5.4.1 Can-claims without OU alternatives
The fact that I argue that the seadog can go sailing at noon because
he  has  the  general  ability  of  sailing  at  noon  is  likely  to  raise  the
following worry. One might wonder whether we should judge that the
seadog can go sailing at noon even when somebody has kidnapped
the seadog and tied him to a post in an abandoned shack. Following
my above reasoning we should come to this conclusion. Even when
he is tied to a post, it is plausible that he still has the general ability to
sail. But it seems natural to deny that the seadog can go sailing in
these circumstances. So the distinction between can-claims of ability
and can-claims of OU alternatives needs improvement.
What  exactly  is  the  difference between the seadog who does  not
have  the  OU alternative  of  going  sailing  because  of  the  way  his
character  is  (as in  the original  seadog case)  and the seadog who
cannot go sailing because he is tied to a post so that we judge that
the  former  can  go  sailing  at  noon,  while  we  judge  that  the  latter
cannot do so?
One tentative explanation is that we treat internal (i.e. psychological)
constraints  differently  from  external  constraints.  It  might  be  more
natural  to deny that  somebody can do something only when he is
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hindered by external constraints like being tied to a post. The external
hindering factors are normally visible and so these cases are easier
to  assess.  For  cases  with  internal  hindering  constraints  (i.e.
psychological  factors)  the  situation  is  much  less  obvious.  What
psychological  state  an agent  is  in  is  not  something which can be
observed  directly.  And  so  in  the  case  of  the  seadog  who  is  in  a
psychological state such that it is not open and up to him to go sailing
we might  come to the conclusion that  he can go sailing  at  noon,
because  we  do  not  observe  anything  preventing  him  from  going
sailing. 
But this answer is not satisfactory either. In order to see this, let us
consider  the  case of  a  phobic  seadog.  If  the  seadog has a  “sea-
phobia” (i.e. being irrationally afraid of the sea) and we know about
this phobia, we do not judge that he can go sailing at noon, although
we cannot directly observe his phobia. And so whether we judge that
the seadog can go sailing  at  noon or  not  cannot  only  depend on
whether  the  hindering  factor  is  external  or  internal  (respectively,
whether it is observable or not). 
I  believe that  part  of  the reason why we judge the phobic seadog
differently  from the original  seadog is  that  the  latter  is  considered
psychologically sane. It is a result of his rational deliberation given his
character that he comes to be in a psychological state which is such
that it is not open and up to him to go sailing at noon. In other words,
it is a result of his character and deliberative activity that it is not open
and  up  to  him  to  go  sailing  at  noon.  Admittedly,  the  deliberative
activity is not a particularly interesting one in this case, because he
simply decides not  to  go sailing on the basis  of  the bad weather-
forecast. Nevertheless it is a rational decision which is based on his
personal preferences and the facts (or rather what  he takes to be
facts) available to him. Would there have been good reasons for him
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to go sailing in spite of the bad weather (e.g. he could have rescued
tourists from drowning), he might have taken a different decision. Or
put slightly differently, would he have wanted to go sailing at noon, he
would have done so. 
Before  reaching  the  conclusion  not  to  go  sailing  (that  is,  before
hearing the bad weather forecast), it was open and up to him to go
sailing at noon.48 Only when the compelling reason not to go sailing at
noon was given to him, it was no longer open and up to the seadog to
go sailing at noon. Without this compelling reason (e.g. if he had not
believed that the weather was going to be bad) it would have been
open and up to the seadog to go sailing at noon. In the case of a
phobia,  whether  an action  is  open  and  up  to  the  agent  does  not
depend on the reasons available to her. What is characteristic of a
phobia is exactly that certain actions are not open and up to the agent
independently of the reasons available to her. The role of reasons in
psychologically sane agents compared to agents with a psychological
condition can be illustrated in a clearer manner with the case of the
gambling mathematician (according to our  first  specification  of  the
case). Before she has made her reasoning, it is both open and up to
her to bet on red or on black. Prior to her rational deliberation, nothing
about her character is such that betting on red or black is not an open
option for her. If she has to immediately make her bet without having
time to go through her probabilistic reasoning both betting on red and
48 This example is problematic for the reason that the case might be such
that the seadog only goes sailing if he has heard the weather-forecast
announcing the weather to be good. We have reason to be believe that if
he misses the weather-forecast it might not be open and up to him to go
sailing at noon. That is,  not  hearing the weather forecast  might  be a
compelling reason for him not to go sailing. 
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betting on black are OU alternatives. If she has time to go through her
probabilistic  reasoning  she  will  normally  reach the  conclusion  that
betting  on  black  is  the  only  reasonable  thing  to  do.  And  as  a
consequence of her character which is such that she always acts in
the light of what she takes to be her best reasons it is no longer open
and up to her to bet on red.49 It would require her to act crazily or out
of  character  to bet  on red.  But  her character  is  not  such that  she
makes such crazy  choices.  Nevertheless,  we  might  be inclined  to
judge that she can bet on red, although it is not open and up to her to
bet  on red.  We do not  have the same inclination in the case of  a
phobic mathematician who we judge to be unable to bet on red (she
cannot bet on red) because she is irrationally afraid of betting on red.
The  phobic  mathematician  cannot  bet  on  red  even  if  it  was  the
mathematically right thing to do. In such a case, we judge that the
mathematician cannot bet on red.
What  distinguishes the psychologically  sane agent  from the agent
with a psychological condition or external constraining factor is that
the  former  is  not  hindered  by  anything  outside  of  the  realm  of
reasons.  For  the  psychologically  sane  agent  the  OU  alternatives
available to her are dependent on the reasons available to her. For
the agent with a psychological condition like a phobia or an agent with
an  external  hindering  factor  like  being  tied  to  a  post  the  OU
alternatives she has do not depend on the reasons available to her.
This crucial difference motivates my claim that the psychological sane
49 Note that  by making a small  calculation mistake she could reach the
wrong conclusion that betting on red is the only mathematically correct
action. In that case betting on black would no longer be open and up to
her.
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agent can do A, even if it is not open and up to her to do A, because
in the light of different reasons (respectively, in the light of a different
evaluation of the reasons available to her50), alternative A would be
open  and  up  to  her.  This  is  not  the  case  for  the  agent  with  a
psychological condition or with an external hindering factor. 
We have seen different cases where an agent (arguably) can do A
although she does not have the OU alternative of doing A. Let us look
at a difference between two of these cases. In the motherly love case,
the mother does not go through any kind of deliberation in order to
decide to save her children. There is no doubt, neither for her nor for
observers,  about  what  she will  do.  In  the gambling mathematician
case, it takes a probabilistic reasoning in order for the mathematician
to come to the conclusion that betting on black is the only reasonable
thing  to  do.  This  reasoning  takes  some  time  and  mistakes  can
happen. The difference between these two cases  is mirrored in my
intuitions  on  the  truth  of  the  can-claims  for  these  two  cases.  My
intuition that the mathematician can bet on red is much stronger than
the  intuition  that  the  mother  can  refrain  from  saving  her  child.  It
seems to me that one can convincingly defend the position that the
mother  cannot  refrain  from  saving  her  child.  In  the  case  of  the
gambling mathematician arguing that she cannot bet on red is a much
more  challenging  task.  I  suspect  that  the  difference  lies  in  the
departure from actuality51 that is needed for the agent to realize the
50 My use  of  'reason'  in  this  work  is  intended  to  be  as  metaphysically
neutral as possible, given I cannot address the topic of the metaphysics
of reasons in the present work.
51 That is, how different from the actual situation the situation would have to
be.
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respective  alternative.  In  the  mathematician  case,  she  needs  to
decide to e.g. leave aside her best mathematical judgement and act
on a hunch. This is something that would not require a big departure
from actuality.52 For the mother  not  to  decide to save her child,  a
much bigger departure from actuality is needed.  She needs to act
completely crazily.  
5.4.2 Tentative  definition  for  can-claims  without
OU-alternative
Let us set aside these differences between these cases and turn to
the task of finding a definition that covers also all  cases where an
agent  can do A although she does not  have the OU alternative of
doing A for cases where nothing but the agent's reasons (respectively
what the agent takes to be the reasons available to her) prevent her
from  doing  A.  I  suggest  the  following  tentative  definition  which
depends on the notion of OU alternative: 
(can*) An agent S can* A in situation C, if and only if, (1) S has the
OU alternative of doing A in C or (2) were S to come to the conclusion
(in a rational deliberation or decision process) that doing A in C is
52 In fact,  when I have treated the gambling mathematician case I have
suggested two specifications of the case. On the first specification, it is
not open and up to the mathematician to act on a hunch and bet on red.
On the second, it is open and up to her to bet on red.
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attractive enough to be chosen, S would have the OU alternative of
doing A in C.
An agent can consider an alternative attractive enough to be chosen
only  if  the  action  is  not  considered  (by  the  agent)  to  be  too
unattractive  to  be  chosen.  In  the  gambling  mathematician  case
(according to the first specification where the mathematician is such
that  she  would  need  to  act  crazily  in  order  to  act  against  her
mathematical judgement), the alternative of betting on red is not open
and up to the agent because it is too unattractive to be chosen (for
the mathematician) given that her chance to win is higher if she bets
on black. In order to see whether the gambling mathematician can*
bet on red, we need to check whether it would be open and up to her
to bet on red, if she had come to the conclusion that betting on red is
attractive enough to be chosen. If she had evaluated that acting on a
hunch  (and  thus  against  her  best  mathematical  judgement)  is
attractive enough to be chosen, then it would have been open and up
to  her  to  bet  on red.  And  thus  the gambling mathematician  fulfils
(can*) and it is true that the mathematician can* bet on red.
Let us check whether we also get the right result in the case of the
seadog who is tied to a post.  If  the tied seadog were to consider
sailing at noon attractive enough to be chosen, then he still would not
have the OU alternative of going sailing at noon, because he is tied to
a post.  And thus we also get  the right  result  that  the tied seadog
cannot* go sailing at noon. This proposal also yields the right results
for  the  phobic  seadog  and the phobic  mathematician.  Even if  the
phobic seadog finds going sailing attractive enough to be chosen, he
does not have the OU alternative of going sailing because of his sea-
phobia  and so we  get  the  correct  answer  that  the  phobic  seadog
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cannot go sailing. Accordingly, even if the phobic mathematician finds
betting on red to be attractive enough to be chosen, she still does not
have the OU alternative to bet on red because of her red-phobia and
so we also get the correct answer that she cannot bet on red. 
5.4.3 Difficulty for the suggested definition
A difficulty in analysing the counterfactual of what would be open and
up to the agent if the agent were to come to the conclusion that an
action is attractive enough to be chosen is to find out whether other
changes of the situation are required. Depending on how we examine
the counterfactuals, we get different results on what is open and up to
the agent. For instance, if we assume (contrary to what I have done
above) that the seadog who is tied to a post only can come to the
conclusion that going sailing is attractive enough to be chosen if he is
not tied to a post, then we get the wrong result, that he can* go sailing
at  noon,  because  it  would  (according  to  this  treatment  of  the
counterfactual) be open and up to him to go sailing at noon if he were
to  come to  the  conclusion  that  going  sailing  at  noon  is  attractive
enough  to  be  chosen.  We  thus  potentially  end  up  with  the  very
problem which we started with at the beginning of 5.4.1. 
This difficulty can be avoided by arguing that these counterfactuals
need to be evaluated according to the Lewisian evaluation. According
to it, we get the result that the counterfactual situation is more similar
to the actual situation if  it  implies no other change of the situation
apart from the different conclusion by the agent (of what is attractive
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enough to be chosen). That is, in the case of the seadog who is tied
to a post, the world in which he arrives at the conclusion that going
sailing is attractive enough to be chosen is one in which he is still tied
to a post. And thus we get the desired result that he cannot go sailing.
To sum up, 'can*' allows us to make the intuitive distinction between
the seadog in the original case who can* go sailing at noon and the
seadog who is tied to a post who cannot go sailing at noon – although
neither of them has the OU alternative of going sailing at noon. 
5.4.4 An  example to  showcase the usefulness of
the distinction
The  following  case  of  Jack  Tar  (another  seaman)  allows  us  to
highlight  the usefulness  of  the suggested distinction  between can-
claims. Contrary to the seadog, Jack Tar loves sailing independently
of the weather conditions. On a fair day, he enjoys the calm of the
sea, and on a stormy day, he enjoys the challenge of sailing in difficult
weather conditions. Like the seadog, Jack Tar always listens to the
weather  forecast  in  the  morning.  But  contrary  to  the  seadog,  his
decision about whether to go sailing or not does not depend on the
weather conditions. Sometimes he decides to go sailing in good or
bad weather conditions and sometimes he decides not to go sailing in
good or bad weather conditions and rather goes to the pub (he loves
going to the pub). 
Today, the weatherman has announced bad weather and Jack Tar is
in good health conditions. Jack Tar decides not to go sailing today, but
97
The Phenomenology of Choice
to spend his afternoon in the pub. Was it open and up to Jack Tar to
go sailing at noon? If we take seriously that both going sailing and
going to the pub are alternatives which are appealing to the Jack Tar
and  the  reasons  available  to  him  are  such  that  both  options  are
attractive, then it seems that we do not have any reason to deny that
it is open and up to him to go sailing at noon. 
Comparing the old  seadog case with  Jack  Tar's  case we see the
usefulness  of  the  distinction  between  can*-claims  and  can-claims
about  OU  alternatives.  There  is  an  important  intuitive  distinction
between the seadog and Jack Tar. For the old seadog to go sailing at
noon in bad weather condition he would need to act crazily or out of
character. For Jack Tar going sailing at noon in bad weather condition
is something that fits his character and usual habits. On the basis of
the proposed distinction we can explain this intuitive distinction. While
both the seadog and Jack Tar can* go sailing at noon, it is only open
and up to Jack Tar to go sailing at noon. 
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6 Alternatives in Deliberation
6.1 Overview
This chapter  is  on the topic  of  deliberation.  In  the first  half  of  the
chapter, I discuss a proposal by John Martin Fischer who defends the
position that an alternative in deliberation has to fulfil the criteria that it
is  an  extension  of  the  actual  situation.  In  the  second  half  of  the
chapter, I discuss whether deliberation is compatible with determinism
and whether  positions that  argue that  it  is  compatible  imply some
possible objection to my incompatibility argument.
Section 6.2 treats Fischer's discussion of a difficulty which arises by
accepting  both  can-claims  and  backtracking  conditionals.  If  the
seadog can go fishing at noon (even when the weather is bad) and if
it is true that if the seaman were to go fishing at noon, the weather
would be fair then the seadog should go fishing at noon in order for
the weather to be fair. Fischer's solution to this problem consists in
defending that in deliberation only alternatives which are extensions
of the situation should play a role. I accept Fischer's criteria, but show
that Fischer nevertheless has to accept a peculiarity (analogous to
the one in chapter 5) because he ties can-claims to extensions of the
situations in which the agent acts accordingly. In section 6.3, I attempt
to  show  how  my  position  combined  with  Fischer's  criteria  for
deliberation avoids this peculiarity. Section  6.4 discusses a possible
objection  to  my  suggestion.  In  section  6.5,  I  address  a  more
substantial worry and suggest that it can be avoided by distinguishing
between conditional  sentences which express a causal  connection
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and conditional sentences which express a necessary condition. 
In section 6.6, I sketch an argument for deliberation-incompatibilism –
the  position  that  deliberation  requires  the  falsity  of  determinism –
which  is  based  on  the  structure  of  my  incompatibility  argument.
Section 6.7 presents an argument by Derk Pereboom for deliberation-
compatibilism – the position  that  deliberation  does not  require  the
falsity  of  determinism.  In  section  6.8,  I  then  examine  whether
accepting  Pereboom's  argument  leads  to  an  objection  for  my
incompatibility argument. Section  6.9 presents an epistemic account
of  openness  by  David  J.  Velleman  which  prima  facie  implies  a
potential objection to my incompatibility argument. 
6.2 Fischer on deliberation 
As we have seen in section 5.2, Fischer argues that a can-claim and
its associated backtracker can both be true. In that section, I have
pointed out some peculiarities that Fischer needs to accept and have
provided a first proposal on how to reconcile the truth of both claims
avoiding these peculiarities53. However, there is another related issue
that arises by accepting both claims which Fischer illustrates in his Icy
Patch case: 
“Sam saw a boy slip and fall on an icy patch on Sam’s sidewalk on
Monday.  The  boy  was  seriously  injured,  and  this  disturbed  Sam
deeply.  On  Tuesday,  Sam must  decide  whether  to  go  ice-skating.
Suppose that Sam’s character is such that if he were to decide to go
53 Cf.  section 5.3.
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ice-skating at noon on Tuesday, then the boy would not have slipped
and hurt himself on Monday.
The situation is puzzling. It seems that Sam is able to decide to go
ice-skating on Tuesday. And it also appears plausible that if he were
to decide to go skating on Tuesday, the terrible accident would not
have occurred on Monday. So it appears that Sam ought to decide to
go ice-skating on Tuesday. And yet, given that Sam knows that the
accident did in fact take place on Monday, it also seems irrational for
Sam to decide to go ice-skating on Tuesday on the basis of a reason
flowing  from  the  truth  of  the  backtracker.”  (Fischer  1994,  p.  95,
original italics)
Fischer  argues  that  Sam  can  go  ice-skating,  because  nothing
prevents him from going ice-skating and so there exists an extension
of  the actual  situation in  which Sam goes ice-skating on Tuesday.
Further,  Fischer  argues  for  the  truth  of  the  backtracker  which
accurately describes Sam’s character. By accepting both these claims
it seems that one should conclude from them that Sam should go ice-
skating, so that the boy does not get injured – which would be a crazy
thing to do. 
In order to show that this conclusion can be avoided, Fischer argues
that in practical deliberation an agent should only take into account
extensions of the actual situations:
“[I]t  seems  reasonable  for  an  agent  to  restrict  his  attention  in
deliberating to the reasons present in such worlds (i.e., those possible
worlds which share the past with the actual world.)” (Fischer 1994, p.
95f)
In  order  to  motivate  this  claim  Fischer  describes  the  following
climbing example:
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“Imagine  that  you  and  I  are  climbing  a  path  upward  toward  a
mountain peak (which is our goal). It is noon, and we started at seven
in the morning. I begin to tell you about another path. That is, I begin
to describe the lovely scenery along that path – the beautiful views of
the valley below, the exquisite stream that runs alongside it, and so
forth. But when you inquire further about it, I point out that we cannot
get to that trail from where we are, because of a deep gorge which
separates us from the other path. To get there we would have had to
have started out on that different path at seven in the morning. Given
this, it is obvious that the reasons for taking that other trail for the rest
of the day are simply irrelevant to our current deliberations. They may
be of great interest to us and help us pass the time as we walk, but
you would be correct to tell me that these reasons – compelling as
they  may  be  –  should  not  play  any  (straightforward)  role  in  our
deliberations about the rest of our day.” (Fischer 1994, p. 96f)
I  consider  Fischer’s  reasoning  to  be  convincing  and  his  example
nicely illustrates his point. Whatever action is not accessible from the
situation an agent is in cannot represent an answer (or at least not a
straightforward  answer)  to  the  question  about  what  to  do  in  that
situation.  If  the  climber  believes  that  there  is  no  extension  of  the
actual situation with him taking the alternative path and enjoying the
scenery from that path then considerations concerning that alternative
should  play  no  role  in  his  deliberation  about  what  to  do  in  this
situation. In the climbing case, it is evident to the agent that there is
no extension of  his  actual  situation  with him taking the alternative
path to enjoy the scenery.  It  is  part  of  the agent’s beliefs that it  is
impossible in his current situation to take the other path or enjoy the
view on the other path. And so there is no problem for the climber to
consider ‘If we were on the other path, we would enjoy the view’ to be
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true and accepting that its truth plays no role in his deliberation about
what to do at that moment. 
For the Icy Patch case the situation is less straightforward. Fischer
argues for the truth of the backtracker that if  Sam were to go ice-
skating on Tuesday, some fact of the actual past would not obtain (i.e.
the accident would not have happened). Fischer’s solution to avoid
the  conclusion  that  Sam  should  act  so  that  the  past  would  be
different, consists in arguing that in deliberation about what to do an
agent  needs  to  restrict  his  attention  to  extensions  of  the  current
situation  and that  the  backtracker  thus  should  play no role  in  the
agent’s deliberation. Remember that in the climbing case the reason
that the alternative plays no role in the practical deliberation is that it
is impossible for the climber to choose the other path in the situation
he  is  in  at  that  time  and  the  climber  knows  of  this  impossibility.
However in Sam’s case the situation is different. It is evident to Sam
that he has no access to an alternative of making the accident from
Monday not happen. Whether Sam goes ice-skating on Tuesday or
not has no influence on the occurrence of the accident on Monday.
However, Fischer also argues that there is an extension with Sam ice-
skating on Tuesday and so that it is open and up to Sam to go ice-
skating on Tuesday. If Sam believes that it is open and up to him to
go ice-skating, it seems that he should also believe (at least during
his  deliberation)  that  were  he  to  go  ice-skating  on  Tuesday  the
accident would nevertheless have taken place on Monday. In the past
of  the  extension  of  the  current  situation  in  which  Sam  goes  ice-
skating on Tuesday, the accident has happened on Monday and there
is no reason to believe that the past would change. In other words,
Sam should believe (at least during the deliberation about what to do)
that the backtracker is false. If Sam believes the backtracker to be
false, then this is clearly different from Fischer’s proposal of believing
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that the backtracker’s truth should play no role in deliberation about
what to do. The backtracker is not simply set aside but it needs to be
considered to be false. In other words, applying Fischer’s criteria for
alternatives  in  deliberation  (that  only  alternatives  which  are
extensions of the actual situation should be taken into account during
deliberation)  leads  to  a  peculiarity  if  one  evaluates  the  cases  as
suggested by Fischer. In what follows, I investigate whether applying
Fischer’s criteria for alternatives solves the problem raised in the Icy
Patch case when one evaluates the cases not as Fischer does, but
as I have suggested above in section 5.3.
6.3 Combining Fischer's criteria with my proposal
In  sections  5.3 and  5.4,  I  have  suggested  that  the  peculiarities
resulting from accepting both the can-claim and the corresponding
backtracker can be avoided if one does not understand the can-claim
as expressing that the agent has an OU alternative, but evaluates it
according to (can*). Note that it is not clear whether we should claim
that Sam can* go ice-skating on Tuesday. Sam is deeply disturbed
about  the  boy’s  accident.  If  this  is  a  psychological  condition  that
prevents Sam from going ice-skating on Tuesday, then it seems that
we should judge that Sam cannot go ice-skating at Tuesday, just as
an  arachnophobic  cannot  touch  a  spider.  But  for  the  sake  of  the
argument,  let  us assume that  Sam is  not  in  such a psychological
condition  and  that  he  simply  decides  on  the  basis  of  a  rational
reasoning (based on what he has observed on Monday) that going
ice-skating is too dangerous. In this case, we should indeed judge
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that Sam can* go ice-skating on Tuesday. Further, we should accept
that there is no extension of the actual situation in which Sam goes
ice-skating  on  Tuesday,  given  his  character  and  preferences  (on
which he bases his  rational  decision).  It  would  require  him to  act
crazily and disregard his rational reasoning that going ice-skating is
too dangerous. But Sam is neither such that he acts crazily nor does
he disregard his reasoning. If  he were such that he disregards his
rational reasoning or acts crazily, it would be false to claim that if he
where  to  go  ice-skating  on  Tuesday the  accident  would  not  have
happened on Monday. 
Following  this  proposal,  we  can  now successfully  apply  Fischer’s
suggested criteria that in practical deliberation only extensions of the
actual situation should play a role. There is no extension of the actual
situation with Sam going ice-skating on Tuesday and so it plays no
role  in  Sam’s  deliberation.  Consequently,  the  problem  that  Sam
should do something such that the past would be different does not
arise.  Note  that  the case of  the  seadog is  similar  to  Sam’s  case.
Although it is true that if the seadog were to go sailing at noon, the
weather would be fair, we do not have to draw the conclusion that the
seadog should go sailing at noon so that the weather would be fair,
because there is no extension of the seadog going sailing at noon.
6.4 OU alternatives during deliberation
The proposed solution might lead to the following objection. One can
concede  that  once  the  deliberative  process  has  ended  and  the
rational decision has been taken it is no longer open and up to the
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agent  to  act  in  a certain way because it  would require her  to  act
crazily which we suppose she is not. However, before having reached
the  conclusion  –  that  is  while  the  agent  is  in  the  middle  of  the
deliberative process – the action is at that moment still open and up
to the agent.  In other words,  during the deliberative process there
exists an extension of the actual situation in which the agent does the
alternative action. Let me elucidate this point on the basis of the Icy
Patch case. Once Sam has taken the decision that it is too dangerous
to go ice-skating on Tuesday, it is no longer open and up to him to go
ice-skating because it would require him to act against his reasoning
and he is not such that he acts against his reasoning. In other words,
at tdend (for the time when the deliberation has ended) it is no longer
open and up to Sam to go ice-skating. But before having reached this
conclusion the situation might  be different.  At  the beginning of  his
deliberative reasoning or during that reasoning (at tdproc, for a time at
the  beginning  or  during  the  deliberation  process)  both  going  ice-
skating and not going ice-skating are alternatives worth considering
for Sam. It is the goal of his deliberation to find out what the right
thing  to  do  is  in  his  situation.  As  long  as  he  has  not  reached  a
conclusion, the reasons he has evaluated up to that moment do not
(yet)  indicate that  going ice-skating or  not  going ice-skating is  too
unattractive to choose.54 One might argue that if  he had to decide
whether  to  go  ice-skating  before  he  has  finished  evaluating  the
54 Note that in Sam’s case the decision might be very straightforward and
might not require a deliberation process which takes time. However, for
the sake of the argument, I assume that Sam does need to evaluate all
the reasons available to him in a deliberation process which takes some
time in order to form a decision about whether or not to go ice-skating on
Tuesday.
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reasons available to him both going ice-skating and not going ice-
skating would be open and up to him at that moment. 
If this suggestion is correct, then one might be inclined to judge that
the solution proposed above to solve the tension between accepting
both the can-claim and the backtracker in deliberation does not solve
the issue highlighted by Fischer. If  during Sam’s deliberation about
whether to go ice-skating or not it is open and up to Sam to go ice-
skating (that is, there is an extension of Sam going ice-skating) and
the backtracker that if  Sam were to go ice-skating on Tuesday the
accident on Monday would not have happened is true, then it seems
that  Sam  should  go  ice-skating  on  Tuesday  so  that  the  accident
would not have happened on Monday.
This objection should be resisted for the following reason. If it is open
and up to Sam to go ice-skating before having come to the conclusion
that  going  ice-skating  is  too  dangerous,  then  the  backtracker  is
obviously  not  true.  Remember that  the backtracker  expresses that
Sam’s character is such that he goes ice-skating only if no accident
has happened on Monday. For the case where he goes ice-skating in
spite of the accident this turns out to be false. And so the problem
does not arise.
6.5 The ambiguity of conditional sentences
The solution remains problematic. I argue that the problem does not
arise because certain alternatives are not open and up to the agent.
Further,  I  agree  that  the  agent  can*  perform  the  respective
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alternatives.  The reason the alternative is  not  open and up to the
agent  is that  the reasons available to the agent  are such that  the
alternative is too unattractive to be chosen and it would require her to
act  crazily,  which  she is  not.  But  if  this  is  the  only  reason  which
prevents the agent from choosing this alternative, one should wonder
whether  believing  in  the  truth  of  the  corresponding  backtracking
conditional should not provide reason enough for this alternative to
become attractive enough to be chosen.  Let  me clarify for  the Icy
Patch case. I argue that the reason why Sam should do something so
that the past would be different does not arise is that it is not open
and up to Sam to go ice-skating. The reason that it is not open and up
to  go  ice-skating  for  Sam  is  that  this  alternative  is  not  attractive
enough to be chosen. And exactly at this point,  one might wonder
whether  the  belief  in  the  truth  of  backtracker  should  not  provide
sufficient  reason  for  the  alternative  of  going  ice-skating  becoming
attractive enough to be chosen. If Sam believes that if he were to go
ice-skating the accident would not have happened on Monday, this
seems to be a very compelling reason.
This  reasoning should  be resisted by pointing  to  an ambiguity for
conditional  sentences.  On  the  one  hand,  one  can  understand  a
conditional sentence as expressing a causal connection, that is, that if
a certain condition obtains, then as a consequence a certain other
event takes place. On the other hand, a conditional sentence can be
understood non-causally.  It  can for example express that a certain
event can only take place in a situation in which a certain condition is
fulfilled.  Now the  question  is  whether  we  need  to  understand  the
backtracker 'if Sam were to go ice-skating on Tuesday the accident
on Monday would not have happened' causally or non-causally. On
the first reading, the backtracker states that Sam going ice-skating on
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Tuesday would have as a consequence that the accident on Monday
would  not  have  taken  place.  Maybe  in  a  world  with  backwards
causation or time travel this might be something that one might want
to express by using the conditional sentence, but in the actual world
we normally do not believe in backwards causation or time travel. And
so  the  conditional  sentence  should  not  be  read  as  expressing  a
causal  connection.  On  the  non-causal  reading  suggested,  the
backtracker states that the closest situations to the actual situation in
which the agent  does something are  situations  in  which a certain
necessary condition obtains. Another way to express this reading is
that an agent does said action only if a certain necessary condition
obtains. If the necessary condition does not obtain the agent does not
do said action. I suggest that we need to understand the backtrackers
in question according to this second non-causal reading. If one takes
this second reading seriously, it becomes clear how we should read
Fischer’s  claim  that  in  practical  deliberation  we  should  only  take
extensions  of  the  actual  situation  into  consideration  and  that  the
backtrackers  do  not  fulfil  this  criteria.  Given  that  the  necessary
condition is not fulfilled, there is no extension of the situation such
that the agent chooses the alternative expressed in the backtrackers.
And so the backtracker cannot play a role in the agent’s deliberation
about what to do. 
In other words, I agree with Fischer that an agent deliberating should
only take into considerations alternatives which are on an extension
of her situation, but disagree with Fischer who argues that there is an
extension  of  the  actual  situation  such  that  the  agent  realizes  the
action  expressed  in  the  backtracker.  I  defend  that  there  is  no
extension  of  the  actual  situation  such  that  the  agent  realizes  the
alternative  expressed  in  the  backtracker  given  that  the  necessary
condition is not fulfilled. 
109
The Phenomenology of Choice
What  about  Sam's  experience  and  beliefs  during  his  deliberation
about what to do? Sam might experience that it is open and up to him
to going skating on Tuesday or he might experience that while he
can* go skating it is not open and up to him to go skating on Tuesday
given his character and preferences. For the former case he has an
illusory experience and based on it also a wrong belief about what is
open and up to him. It seems to him that it is open and up to him to
go  skating  on  Tuesday  although  the  accident  has  happened  on
Monday  and  so  he  also  does  not  believe  in  the  truth  of  the
backtracker. He believes the backtracker that if he were to go skating
on Tuesday, the accident would not have happened to be false.  
In the latter case in which Sam experiences that while he can* go
skating it is not open and up to him to go skating on Tuesday given
his character and preferences, Sam has a veridical experience and
true belief about what is open and up to him. He believes that it is
actually not open and up to him to go skating. He beliefs that in order
to go skating on Tuesday the accident would have had not to happen
on Monday. That is,  he truly believes the backtracker.  He believes
that the necessary condition for him to go skating on Tuesday is not
fulfilled.  The  problematic  conclusion  that  he  should  go  skating  on
Tuesday in order for Monday's accident not to happen does not arise
according to this reading of the backtracker.
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6.6 Sketching  an  argument  for  deliberation-
incompatibilism
Above, I concur with Fischer’s thesis that an agent should take only
extensions of her actual situation into consideration when deliberating
about what to do. If  one assumes that deliberation necessitates an
agent having at least two OU alternatives, one might be inclined to
conclude that deliberation requires the falsity of determinism. If the
thesis of determinism is true, there exists, for every situation, only one
extension  of  the  situation.  And  if  one  assumes  that  deliberation
requires multiple OU alternatives and thus multiple extensions of a
situation, it turns out that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
deliberation.  As  a  consequence,  if  one  believes  to  have  different
alternatives  and  believes  that  determinism  is  true,  one  has
inconsistent  beliefs55.  Let  me  sketch  such  an  argument  for
deliberation-incompatibilism  based  on  the  structure  of  my
incompatibility argument.
(1) When an agent deliberates about what to do, she believes to have
(at least) two alternatives which are open and up to her.
(2) An alternative is open and up to the agent only if there exists an
extension of the situation such that the agent realizes the alternative
in that extension.
55 Cf. Ginet (1966), Taylor (1966).
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(3) There exists no single action an agent can do to realize more than
one of the OU alternatives she believes to have, i.e. the realization of
OU alternatives is mutually exclusive.
(4)  From  (1),  (2)  and  (3)  we  can  infer  that  the  agent’s  belief  in
deliberation of having at least two OU alternatives can be true only if
there exists one extension of the situation for every OU alternatives
the agent believes to have.
(5) Assumption that nomological determinism is true.
(6) From (5) follows that there exists only one extension of a situation.
(7)  From  (4)  and  (6)  we  can  directly  conclude  that  under  the
assumption  of  (nomological)  determinism,  the  agent’s  belief  in
deliberation of having at least two OU alternatives cannot be true and
is thus systematically false.
One possibility to resist such an argument is to defend the view that
alternatives  do  not  need  to  fulfil  a  metaphysical  openness
requirement (as expressed by premises (1) and (2) in the argument
above) but merely an epistemic requirement. According to such views
it is possible to truly deliberate even if determinism were true. In the
next section I present an elaborate argument by Derk Pereboom who
defends such a position. 
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6.7 Pereboom's  argument  for  deliberation-
compatibilism
In this section, I present an epistemic openness criteria defended in
an  argument  for  deliberation-compatibilism  (i.e.  an  argument  that
attempts to show that rational deliberation does not require the falsity
of determinism) by Derk Pereboom.56
In  his  argument,  Pereboom  defends  the  claim  that  the  openness
required for deliberation is not to be understood as metaphysical, but
merely as epistemic. He provides the following openness criteria:
“(S) In order to deliberate rationally among distinct actions A1...An, for
each Ai, S cannot be certain of the proposition that she will do Ai, nor
of the proposition that she will not do A i; and either (a) the proposition
that  she will  do Ai is  consistent  with  every proposition that,  in  the
present context, is settled for her, or (b) if it is inconsistent with some
such proposition, she cannot believe that it is.” (Pereboom 2008, p.
294)
And here is Pereboom’s definition for a settled proposition:
“(Settled)  A proposition  is  settled  for  an  agent  just  in  case  she
believes it and disregards any doubt she has it is true, e.g., for the
purpose of deliberation.” (Pereboom 2008, p. 294)
Let us consider whether this proposal yields the right responses in the
climbing case57. Remember that Fischer has presented the climbing
56 Pereboom (2008). Pereboom presents his account as an amendment of
a position by Tomis Kapitan (1986).
57 Cf. section 6.2.
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case to motivate the criteria that deliberating agents should only take
into  consideration  extensions  of  their  actual  situation.  Does
Pereboom’s suggested criterion (S), together with (Settled), succeed
in avoiding that the climbers should consider enjoying the view on the
other  path to be an alternative? It  does for  two possible  reasons.
Either the climbers are certain that they will not enjoy the view on the
other path and so they cannot deliberate about whether to enjoy the
view on the other path. Or enjoying the view on the other path is not
consistent with what is settled for them, e.g. because what is settled
for them is that they can climb just with a certain speed and that the
other path is at a certain distance from them.58 
The  suggested  criteria  seems  promising,  however,  as  Pereboom
notes59, there exists a famous challenge to deliberation-compatibilism
that has been raised by Peter van Inwagen:
“... imagine that [an agent] is in a room with two doors and that he
believes one of the doors to be unlocked and the other door to be
locked and impassable, though he has no idea which is which; let him
then  attempt  to  imagine  himself  deliberating  about  which  door  to
leave by.” (Van Inwagen 1983, p. 154)60
Both  opening-the-first-door  (A1)  and  opening-the-second-door  (A2)
fulfil  the  epistemic  openness  requirement  (S),  as  they  are  both
consistent with what is settled for the agent. Further, (A1) and (A2)
are not such that the agent is certain that she will do A1 resp. do A2
58 In both cases, I believe that the reason the criteria is not fulfilled is that
they believe that enjoying the view on the other path is not open and up
to them.
59 Pereboom (2008), p. 296f.
60 As quoted in Pereboom (2008), p. 296.
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or certain that she will not do A1 resp. do A2. In other words, both
(A1) and (A2) fulfil the epistemic openness criteria. But it is evident
that an agent who is in the two-door situation cannot deliberate about
which door to open (although she can deliberate about which door
she  wants  to  try  to  open)61 and  so  the  criteria  on  its  own  is  not
successful to capture alternatives for deliberation.
Pereboom thus suggests  adding  the following  deliberation  efficacy
requirement:
“(DE) In order to rationally deliberate about whether to do A1 or A2,
where A1 and A2 are distinct actions, an agent must believe that if as a
result of her deliberating about whether to do A1 or A2  she were to
judge that it would be best to do A1, then, under normal conditions,
she would also, on the basis of this deliberation, do A1; and similarly
for A2.” (Pereboom 2008, p. 299)
In order for this proposal to be successful, (DE) needs to be such,
that an agent in a two-door case does not fulfil (DE) and an agent in a
regular deterministic deliberation situation does fulfil (DE). It is evident
that an agent in a two-door situation cannot fulfil (DE). If the first door
is closed, the agent will not succeed to open it even if she decides to
open it. However for a deterministic deliberation scenario there is no
reason to doubt the truth of deliberative efficacy.62 And so if we follow
61 On this point see also Nelkin (2004) and Kapitan (1986).
62 One doubt whether (DE) is fulfilled in deterministic scenarios could come
from the fallacy of confusing determinism with fatalism (cf. Holton (2009),
p. 178ff). That is, if an agent is determined to do A2, and one wonders
what would happen if she were to decide to A1, then one would falsely
conclude that she would nevertheless do A2 because she is determined
to do so. However, accepting determinism does evidently not consist in
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Pereboom’s  proposal  we  have  two  necessary  requirements  for
alternatives  that  do  not  require  the  falsity  of  determinism  which
together  with  other  uncontroversial  requirements  constitute  a
sufficient condition for deliberation alternatives. 
6.8 Consequences  of  Pereboom's  argument  for
my incompatibility argument 
Assuming Pereboom's argument is correct, one might wonder about
the consequences for  my incompatibility  argument.  I  would  like  to
remind  the  reader  that  my  incompatibility  argument  is  about
alternatives  we  experience  to  have.  On  the  basis  of  these
experiences we then usually form the belief that we have this kind of
alternatives which are open and up to us. That we normally have this
kind of beliefs is something that also Pereboom agrees to: 
“It does seem plausible that when we deliberate about what to do, we
typically presuppose that we have more than one distinct option for
which action to perform, each of which is available to us in the sense
that  we  can  or  could  perform each  of  these  actions.”  (Pereboom
2008, p. 289) 63
accepting such a thesis.
63 Randolph Clarke has also defended in his Libertarian Accounts of Free
Will  (2003) that while it is possible to deliberate even if one believes in
the truth of determinism, we normally do have beliefs about alternatives
which are incompatible with the truth of determinism: 
“One  might  on  some  occasion,  deliberate  about  whether  to  A while
believing no more about one’s abilities with respect to A-ing than that if
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Consequently, arguments for deliberation-compatibilism represent no
direct  objection to my incompatibility argument.  My argument does
not  require  that  we  take  the  experience  to  be  veridical,  all  I  am
claiming is that the experience can be veridical only if determinism is
false. If we have reason to believe that determinism is true, then one
simply  has  to  accept  the  consequence  that  the  experience  is
illusory.64 If one takes the experience to be illusory, one has a reason
one has better reason to A than to do anything else, then, by deliberating
about whether to A, one can, in an acceptably efficient way, bring it about
that  one  finds  that  reason,  decides  to  A,  and  A-s  (for  that  reason).
Deliberating makes sense even if one believes no more than this (Clarke
1992a).  One might,  on  occasion,  by  exercising careful  self-discipline,
deliberate  while  presuming  no  more  than  this  if,  for  example,  one  is
convinced that determinism is true and that its truth precludes our having
any open alternatives to what we do and if, at the same time, one very
much wants to avoid holding beliefs that contradict this conviction.
But this more cautious presumption is not our usual one. And I do not
think that  we are able  always to  practice such self-discipline.  We do
generally  take  it  for  granted  that  each  of  the  alternatives  we  are
considering  is  open.  And  even  if  we  are  capable,  on  occasion,  of
deliberating  without  believing  this,  the  presumption  is  practically
inescapable on a consistent basis. It is deeply a part of our nature, or our
second nature, to presume this when we deliberate. Whatever we may
think  during  our  philosophical  reflections  about  the  openness  of  the
future, and whatever we may manage, with careful self-discipline, to do
on some occasions, it will generally be the case when we deliberate that
we presume the indicated openness.” (Clarke (2003), p. 112f)
64 Cf.  Clarke (2003),  p.  114:  “Thus,  if  determinism, is true,  and if  either
variety of incompatibilism is correct, then at least when we deliberate, we
presume that alternatives are open when they are not.  We are,  then,
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to refrain from forming the beliefs about OU alternatives (based on
the experience of the OU alternatives) which are inconsistent with the
belief in the truth of determinism. 
Before  raising an objection  to  Pereboom's  position  in  chapter  7,  I
discuss an argument by J. David Velleman who defends an epistemic
account for alternatives.
6.9 Velleman’s epistemic account
In the above two sections, we have seen that it might be possible to
deliberate even if determinism were true by taking alternatives to be
mere epistemic possibilities. While, as we have also seen above, this
does  not  represent  a  direct  objection  to  my  argument,  one  can
formulate  a  direct  objection  to  my  incompatibility  argument  by
defending the view that  we do not  experience OU alternatives but
merely  epistemic  alternatives.  In his  1989  article  “Epistemic
Freedom”, J. David Velleman argues that we mistake our experiences
of freedom to be about causal or metaphysical freedom while they are
in fact merely about epistemic freedom. This position thus assumes
prima  facie  that  our  experience  of  choice  is  veridical  if  we  have
epistemic freedom rather than metaphysical freedom. But what does
epistemic freedom consist in according to Velleman? Let me start with
what it does not consist in according to him. Epistemic freedom does
not presuppose any physical or psychological possibility. The relevant
subject to an illusion.” 
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alternatives need not be something the agent can actually do in the
situation  she  is  in.  When  one  enjoys  epistemic  freedom  one
experiences the future to be open in the following sense: There are
several, incompatible ways for the agent to describe the future which
are correct descriptions of the future. Velleman thinks that decisions
are self-fulfilling prophecies. According to his proposal, decisions are
assertive states and one speaks the truth if one describes correctly
what one is going to do. For the sake of the argument, I will assume –
while  discussing Velleman’s  argument  –  that  decisions  are indeed
self-fulfilling prophecies. When an agent is in a decision situation with
several  choices  open  to  her,  she  has  several  ways  to  correctly
describe the future, even if determinism is true and what is going to
happen is fixed. Note that for an external observer there is only one
correct description of what the agent is going to do, but this is not the
case for the agent herself. The agent is epistemically free. Based on
the evidence available to her, the agent is justified in believing that
whatever she decides to do is what she is going to do. This is true for
all alternatives which are given to her. There is no risk for her to make
a wrong prediction by taking the wrong decision. Whatever decision
she takes, she will have correctly predicted what she is going to do.
The fact that she is predetermined to make a specific choice does not
prevent her from having the epistemic freedom that were she to make
a  different  choice  she  would  thereby  also  have  made  the  right
prediction. 
To give an example, let us assume that I am predetermined to choose
A, and B is the other alternative given to me, then I am epistemically
free about whether I will do A or B in the sense that at the moment of
choice the two following sentences are correct predictions I can make
of my future. Were I to decide to A, I would thereby correctly predict
that I will A and were I to decide to B, I would thereby correctly predict
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that I will B. And there is no present fact that makes one of the two
predictions a wrong prediction, even if I am predetermined to decide
to A.
Velleman’s point is not that we  ignore  what we are going to do. He
suggests that even if I know that I am determined to decide to A I still
have the epistemic freedom to decide to B because if I were to decide
to B I would thereby correctly predict  that I  will  B. Obviously I will
decide  to  A,  otherwise  it  would  not  have  been  true  that  I  am
determined to decide to A.
But  does  Velleman’s  proposal  represent  an  objection  to  my
incompatibility  argument?  First,  it  is  not  clear  whether  we  should
identify what I label as experience of OU alternatives with what he
labels  as  experiences  of  freedom.  But  even  assuming  that  he  is
referring to the same experience, it is not at all evident whether we
should consider his proposal as an objection to my account. When he
develops his argument he states that we have the illusory experience
of being metaphysically free:
“My thesis is that [...], the experience [of metaphysical freedom] is an
understandable illusion. Our sense of an open future is occasioned by
a  genuine  indeterminacy,  I  believe,  but  the  indeterminacy  that
occasions  it  is  not  the  metaphysical  indeterminacy  that  the
experience  represents  to  us. Our  future  is  undetermined,  I  shall
argue, in a way that explains our feeling of freedom without conflicting
with determinism.” (Velleman 1989, p. 34, my italics)
In other words, Velleman position should be read as an error theory
for our experience of metaphysical freedom under the assumption of
determinism. Nothing of what Velleman says is in contradiction with
my  claim  that  a  careful  description  of  our  experiential  content  in
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choice situation contains that we experience to have OU alternatives
and that this experience is illusory if determinism were true. 
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7 Alternatives and Newcomb's problem
7.1 Overview 
In  this  chapter,  I  tackle  Newcomb's  problem  with  the  help  of  the
findings of the earlier chapters. A second objective of this chapter is to
challenge Pereboom's epistemic account which has been discussed
in section 6.7.
Section  7.2 introduces  Newcomb's  problem.  I  present  Fischer's
strategy to resolve the problem and suggest that some peculiarities
Fischer needs to accept can be avoided with my account. In section
7.3,  I  discuss  a  variant  of  Newcomb's  problem  with  an  infallible
predictor.  This  variant  is  then  combined  in  section  7.4 with  van
Inwagen's  Two-Door  scenario  in  order  to  challenge  Pereboom's
epistemic account.  In sections  7.5 and  7.6, I  suggest  that  it  is  not
possible to reconcile the choice premise of Newcomb's problem with
an  infallible  predictor.  7.5 presents  a  rejection  of  standard
counterfactual accounts about alternative and  7.6 suggests that the
two above-mentioned premises cannot be reconciled.
7.2 Newcomb's problem 
The famous Newcomb's problem has been first published by Robert
Nozick as follows:
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„Suppose a being in whose power to predict your choices you have
enormous confidence. (One might tell a science-fiction story about a
being from another planet, with an advanced technology and science,
who you know to be friendly, etc.) You know that this being has often
correctly predicted your choices in the past (and has never, so far as
you  know,  made an  incorrect  prediction  about  your  choices),  and
further more you know that this being has often correctly predicted
the choices of other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the
particular  situation to be described below.  One might  tell  a  longer
story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being's
prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be
correct.
There  are  two  boxes,  (B1)  and  (B2).  (B1)  contains  $1000.  (B2)
contains either $1,000,000 ($M) or nothing. What the content of (B2)
depends upon will be discussed in a moment.
[...] You have a choice between two actions:
(1) taking what is in both boxes
(2) taking only what is in the second box.
Furthermore, and you know this, the being knows that you know this,
and so on:
(I) If the being predicts that you will take what is in both boxes, he
does not put the $M in the second box.
(II) If the being predicts you will take only what is in the second box,
he does put the $M in the second box.
The situation is as follows. First the being makes its prediction. Then
it puts the $M in the second box, or does not, depending upon what it
has predicted. Then you make your choice. What do you do?“ (Nozick
1969, p. 114f)
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In his paper, Nozick asks the reader who is not yet familiar with the
problem to put the article aside and think about the problem before
continuing  to  read.  This  is  surely  a  suggestion  worth  following.  I
continue here by explaining the reasoning I went through the first time
I was confronted with Newcomb’s problem. At first, it seemed evident
to  me that  I  should  choose  option  (2),  i.e.  I  should  take only  the
second box. The reasoning behind this choice is that the predictor
has always been right and I expect her to be right this time too. The
being will have predicted that I will take only the second box and will
thus have put  $M in it.  Were I  to  choose to take both boxes,  the
predictor would have predicted it and put nothing in the second box
and I would only get $1000. And so the choice seemed obvious. But
then,  the  following  reasoning  radically  changed  my  view  of  the
problem  and  I  switched  camp  from  the  “one-boxers”  to  the  “two-
boxers”. No matter what the predictor has predicted, the content of
the boxes is fixed once the predictor has put the money in the boxes.
Whatever  I  choose  to  do  will  not  make  any  money  appear  or
disappear from the boxes. If the predictor has put $M in the second
box, there is no reason not to take the first box, too. And if she has
put no money in the second box, I cannot make money appear by
only taking the second box and so I should take both boxes to get at
least the $1000 from the first  box.  For both cases, I  am better  off
taking both boxes and so that’s what I should do.
Nevertheless the problem remains utterly puzzling. If  you think that
two-boxing is the right option, you nevertheless expect the predictor
to  be  right  and  thus  expect  to  get  only  $1000.  Further,  you  also
believe that if  you were to act against your two-boxing strategy by
taking only the second box, you’d get $M. As a two-boxer the two-
boxing strategy thus seems irrational. The situation is no better for the
one-boxer. She will be confronted with the fact that she’s leaving the
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money from the first box on the table, although she could just take it.
Whatever money is in the boxes remains in the boxes, the content will
not change and so it is irrational to leave the money of the first box on
the table when one has the choice of taking the money from both
boxes. As a one-boxer the one-boxing strategy seems irrational, too. 
John Martin Fischer65 has offered a solution based on his notion of
accessibility66. The kernel of his strategy is to grant the truth of the
backtrackers “If  I  do X,  the being will  have predicted this”67 which
motivate a one-boxing strategy but to argue that these backtrackers
should  play  no  role  in  the  participant’s  deliberation  about  what  to
choose  because  the  participant  should  only  consider  reasons
obtaining in extensions of her situation.68 In a situation where there is
no  money  in  the  second  box,  only  worlds  with  no  money  in  the
second box are accessible. And for this case taking both boxes is
better than taking only the empty second box. In a situation where
there is $M in the second box,  only worlds which have $M in the
second box are accessible. Thus it is also better to take both boxes
and get  $M+$1000 rather  than only the $M from the second box.
Thus, two-boxing is the right strategy in both cases and that’s what
the participant should choose to do. 
While  Fischer’s  strategy  is  elegant,  one  still  has  to  accept  the
65 Cf. Fischer (1994), pp. 98-110.
66 Cf. chapter 5.
67 The  backtrackers  are  true  according  to  Fischer  because  the  closest
worlds to the actual  world in which the participant  chooses differently
than  in  the  actual  world,  are  worlds  where  the  being  has  made  the
correct prediction.
68 Fischer (1994), p. 101.
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peculiarity that in the context of deliberation not only should one not
take  into  account  the  truth  of  the  backtrackers69,  but  one  has  to
believe  that  they  could  be  false.  According  to  Fischer’s  proposal,
worlds  where  the  predictor  is  mistaken  are  accessible  by  the
participant.  What  is  accessible  by  the  participant  is  limited  by the
content of the boxes and not by the predictions of the being. If the
being has predicted that the participant will take only the second box,
it is still accessible by the participant to take both boxes. That is, one
has to believe that the being could have made a wrong prediction and
that the backtrackers thus could be false.
At this stage, I use the same strategy as I use in chapters  5 and  6
and  argue  contra  Fischer  that  we  should  either  reject  that  the
alternative which would make the predictor wrong is accessible by the
participant or, if we accept that there is an extension of the situation
such that the predictor is wrong, we should consequently also reject
the truth of the backtrackers. 
I  start  by  examining  the  option  of  rejecting  the  truth  of  the
backtrackers.  In  order  to  see  the  attractiveness  of  this  option,  I
suggest an analysis of the backtrackers in question.
In  section  6.5,  I  defended  two  possible  readings  for  conditional
sentences,  a  causal  and  a  non-causal  reading.  On  the  causal
reading,  ‘if  A,  then  B’  expresses  that  B  happens  as  a  causal
consequence of A. On the non-causal reading, one expresses by ‘if A,
then B’ that B is a necessary condition for A. Further, I argued that for
69 According to Fischer’s analysis, the worlds which make the backtrackers
true are not accessible by the participant in the choice situation because
they require the past to be different (i.e. different prediction by the being)
than it actually is.
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the backtrackers that  we were interested in  for  the Icy Patch and
Salty Old Seadog cases, we should read the backtrackers according
to  the  suggested  non-causal  reading.  That  is,  B  is  not  to  be
understood as a consequence of A, but as a necessary condition for
A. 
What can we say about the backtrackers in the Newcomb problem?
First, we should note that the backtrackers we have encountered in
the other cases were descriptions of the agent’s character. They were
expressing,  according  to  my  proposal,  that  an  agent  only  does
something if a certain necessary condition obtains. The backtrackers
in  the  Newcomb case  do  not  describe  the  participant’s  character.
They say  something  about  a  situation  with  a  being who is  highly
skilled in predicting the participants’ choices. Let us put this difference
aside  and  continue  with  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the
backtracker ‘if the participant were to do A, then the being would have
predicted that the participant would do A’ expresses that it is a causal
consequence of the participant doing A that the being has made the
prediction she has made.  I  take it  to  be common ground that  the
agent’s  action  cannot  modify  the  prediction  or  the  content  of  the
boxes which was already in the boxes before the agent's choice (as
we normally do not believe in backwards causation) and that thus, the
prediction  cannot  be  a  causal  consequence  of  the  participant’s
choice.  But  does  the  backtracker  express  that  it  is  a  necessary
condition for the participant to choose A that the being has predicted
so?  The  way  the  case  is  described,  this  is  not  the  case.  The
description  contains  that  the  participant  has  two  choices,  she  can
either  take  both  boxes  or  only  the  second  box.  The  participant's
choice is not specified as restricted by the prediction. If this is right,
then we either need a further alternative non-causal reading of the
backtracker  or  we  should  reject  the  truth  of  the  backtracker  by
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replacing it by a similar but more appropriate claim. My proposal is
that the claim that we should accept is the following: If I choose to A,
then I have reason to expect that the being has predicted this and
acted  accordingly.70 This  claim  is  not  a  claim  about  a  causal
consequence or necessary condition of my choice. All that is claimed
is that I have reason to expect a correlation between my choice and
the prediction. No causal link is thereby claimed to exist and it does
not  say either  that  the  prediction  is  a  necessary condition  for  my
choice. 
Let us compare Newcomb’s problem with the following example by
Alan  Gibbard  about  the  correlation  between  smoking  and  lung-
70 Note  that  under  the  assumption  that  the  predictor  is  infallible,  the
backtrackers are true whenever the suggested claim holds. This is so
because under this assumption the correlation between the participant’s
choice and the prediction holds in all worlds closest to the actual world.
However, if the predictor is merely inerrant (i.e. she is not infallible, but
has nevertheless never made a mistake in the actual world), then there
are worlds most similar to the actual world (which are identical with the
actual world up to the participant’s choice) in which the choice of the
participant and the prediction do not match. If the predictor is inerrant,
the backtracker does not hold, but merely the proposed weaker claim.
The proposed claim allows for the possibility of wrong predictions by the
agent (they are unexpected, but not impossible), the backtracker permits
no such possibility. Note that Fischer disagrees with this evaluation of
similarity or closeness between worlds. He argues that worlds in which
the predictor is right (i.e. with a different past than the actual past) are
closer to the actual world than worlds which are identical with the actual
world up to the moment of choice in which the predictor has made a
wrong prediction. (cf. Fischer (1994), p. 101)
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cancer:
“It is discovered that the reason for the correlation between smoking
and  lung  cancer  is  not  that  smoking  tends  to  cause  lung  causer.
Rather, the cause of lung cancer is a certain genetic factor,  and a
person gets lung cancer if and only if he has that factor. The reason
for  the  correlation  of  lung  cancer  with  smoking  is  that  the  same
genetic factor predisposes people to smoke.
A smoker who knows these facts is trying to decide whether to give
up  smoking….He  likes  to  smoke,  but  wants  much  more  to  avoid
cancer than to continue to smoke.” 71
Whether the smoker continues to smoke or gives up smoking cannot
change his genetic structure. If he has the genetic factor that causes
lung  cancer,  his  stopping  to  smoke  cannot  change  this  fact.  The
underlying  structure  of  the  Gibbard-smoker-case  is  a  causal  fork.
Both  the  smoking-habit  and  the  lung-cancer  are  causal
consequences of a common cause: the genetic factor. But there is no
causal link between the smoking-habit and the lung-cancer and thus
giving up smoking cannot prevent lung-cancer. 
One way to understand the underlying structure for  the Newcomb
case is  a causal  fork,  too.  There is  a factor  (e.g.  the participant's
character  and  preferences)  which  influences  both  the  participant’s
choice and the being’s prediction. If this suggestion is appropriate, we
have  an  explanation  for  the  correlation  between  the  participant’s
choices and the being’s predictions. And it  becomes clear that the
71 Gibbard,  Alan  “Decision  Matrices  and  Instrumental  Expected  Utility”,
unpublished  paper  presented  to  a  conference  at  the  University  of
Pittsburgh,  as  quoted  in  Horgan  (1981),  p.  352f.  Quoted  in  Fischer
(1994), p. 103.
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participant should not decide on the basis of the expected correlation
between her  choice  and  the prediction.  The being has  based her
prediction  solely  on  the  factor  which  influences  the  participant’s
choice, respectively what the participant is inclined to choose. It is not
influenced by the later  choice of  the participant.  Thus,  it  becomes
clear that  the participant  should choose the strategy which is best
depending  on  the  extensions  of  the  actual  situation.  And  for  that
purpose  the  best  strategy is  one  which  is  best  for  both the  case
where the being has predicted on the basis of a factor indicating that
the participant will only take the second box and also for the case that
the being has predicted on the basis of a factor indicating that the
participant  will  take  both  boxes.  The  strategy  satisfying  this
requirement is, as we have seen, the strategy of taking both boxes. 
Note that although the participant should not base her decision on the
expectation that the being will  have made the right prediction, it  is
nevertheless rational to expect the predictor to be right this time, too.
But the participant in her situation cannot do any better. She can only
hope that  the factor  the being has based her prediction upon was
indicating  that  she  was  going  to  take  only  the  second  box.  If  it
indicated that she was going to take both boxes, then the being is
going to be right. But would the participant in this situation only take
the second box, she would end up with nothing. So she is doing the
right thing by taking both boxes. There is no better option available to
the participant given the being’s prediction (on which the participant
has no influence at the moment of choice). 
Let us return to the comparison with Gibbard’s smoker case. Given
that the person is a smoker, she expects to get lung cancer, because
being a smoker is a good indicator for lung cancer. But when it comes
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to the decision whether to continue or stop smoking, it is clear that
this decision has no influence on whether she will  get lung cancer
given that the cause for lung cancer does not depend on whether she
continues to smoke or not. Thus the expectation (which is rational for
the smoker to have) that he will get lung cancer, because she is a
smoker, should play no role in her decision about what to do now. 
7.3 Infallible predictor 
The solution above presupposes that the being is not infallible, but
merely inerrant. The predictor has always been right and never made
a  wrong  prediction  (presumably,  the  influencing  factor  is  a  very
reliable indicator). Nevertheless, when the participant has to choose,
both choices are open and up to her.  That is,  there exists also an
extension  of  the  situation  where  the  predictor  is  wrong.  And  thus
although the predictor has never been mistaken she is not infallible. 
Let us consider a Newcomb scenario with an infallible predictor. This
case is realized, for example, if the factor on which the being bases
her  prediction fully  determines both the being’s  prediction  and the
participant’s choice. In such a case the backwards conditionals hold,
as the predictor is always right and the participant  never makes a
choice that the being has not predicted. The consequence is that the
alternatives of taking either only the second box or both boxes cannot
both be open and up to the agent. For every situation, there exists
only the extension of the situation in which the predictor is right. What
should the agent do in this case?
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I want to defend the view that a Newcomb situation with an infallible
predictor has inconsistent premises.72 The truth of the  infallibility of
the predictor premise requires the participant to have only one OU
alternative, while the choice premise requires the participant to have
both  the  OU alternative  of  taking  both  boxes  as  well  as  the  OU
alternative of  taking only the second box.  If  this is  correct,  then a
Newcomb case with an infallible predictor cannot be realized and thus
we no longer have to answer the question of what the agent should
do. 
This solution (or rather dissolution of the problem) presupposes that
having a choice requires having two OU alternatives. This solution is
in line with Fischer’s strategy for the inerrant predictor case – only
extensions of the situation should be considered in deliberation, i.e.
only OU alternatives. However, as we have seen in section 6.7, Derk
Pereboom  defends  the  view  that  deliberation  alternatives  merely
need  to  fulfil  epistemic  requirements.  They need  to  fulfil  both  the
openness requirement (S) and the deliberation efficacy requirement
(DE). In a Newcomb case with an infallible predictor, the alternatives
of taking both boxes and taking only the second box both fulfil the two
requirements. The participant’s alternatives fulfil the openness criteria
because  for  each  alternative  the  participant  is  not  certain  of  the
proposition that she will do X, nor of the proposition that she will not
do X.  Further,  the proposition that she will  do X is consistent  with
every proposition that, in the present context, is settled for her. The
participant’s  alternatives  also  fulfil  the  deliberation  efficacy
72 This  solution  for  the  infallible  predictor  has  also  been  suggested  by
Fischer: “[I]t seems that, if the predictor is genuinely infallible, the puzzle
conditions are not  coherent:  it  cannot  be blithely assumed that  I  can
either take one box or two.” (Fischer 1994, p. 106) 
132
The Phenomenology of Choice
requirement because in her situation the participant believes of each
alternative that if as a result of her deliberation about whether to take
both boxes or only the second box she were to judge it best to do X,
then, under normal conditions, she would also, on the basis of this
deliberation, do X. 
Below,  I  raise  a  doubt  about  whether  a  participant  with  two
alternatives  fulfilling  Pereboom’s  epistemic  criteria  really  has  a
choice.  In  order  to  do  so,  I  propose  to  return  to  the  Two  Door
scenario73.  Van Inwagen introduced this scenario to suggest that an
agent  in  a  situation  with  an  unlocked  and  a  locked  door  cannot
choose which door to open. While this argument is convincing for the
two doors case, we have seen that Pereboom defends the view that
the argument cannot be applied to deterministic scenarios in general.
In order for an action to be an alternative, according to Pereboom’s
account, it has to fulfil both the openness and the deliberation efficacy
requirement.  The  Two  Door  scenario  cannot  fulfil  the  deliberation
efficacy requirement, because the agent has no reason to believe that
if she were to judge it to be best to open the door that happens to be
locked she would  succeed.  This  is  not  so for  deterministic  choice
situations in general. For each alternative the agent believes to have,
she also believes that if she were to judge it best to choose it, she
would succeed. In what follows, I challenge Pereboom’s account by
introducing a two door scenario with an infallible predictor.
73 Cf. section 6.7.
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7.4 The  Two  Door  Scenario  with  an  Infallible
Predictor
Suppose you are in a situation with two doors, one unlocked and one
locked. Further, there is an infallible being who has predicted which
door you are going to try to open. The being who is the only one able
to lock or unlock these doors, unlocked the door she predicts you are
going to try to open and locked the other. Now it is your turn. You do
not have any indication about which door is locked and which one is
unlocked. Can you choose which door to open?
Both  alternatives  fulfil  the  openness  and  deliberate  efficacy
requirement.  The  openness  criteria  is  fulfilled  because  for  each
alternative you are not certain of the proposition that you will do X,
nor of the proposition that you will not do X. Further, the proposition
that  you will  do X is  consistent  with every proposition  that,  in  the
present context, is settled for you (or if  it is inconsistent with some
such  proposition,  you  cannot  believe  that  it  is).  The  deliberation
efficacy  requirement  is  also  fulfilled  because  in  your  situation  you
believe of each alternative that if as a result of your deliberation about
which door to open you were to judge it  best to do X, then, under
normal conditions, you would also, on the basis of this deliberation,
do X.74 Further, you believe the predictor to be infallible and hence
you have no reason to doubt that the door you will try to open will
indeed be unlocked. Thus, according to the epistemic account, you
can deliberate about which door to open. But can you really choose
74 Note that the requirement is conditional. If you have no reason to judge
one  alternative  to  be  better  than  the  other,  you  still  can  fulfil  the
requirement.
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which door to open? 
I defend the view that an agent in this situation has no choice about
which door to open by appealing to the following intuition. Given that
one door is locked and the participant cannot unlock the door, she
cannot choose whether or not to open the locked door and thus she
has no choice about which door to open.
If this is correct, Pereboom's epistemic alternatives account gives us
the wrong answer and should be rejected. Although the agent has no
choice  about  whether  to  open  the  locked  door,  the  epistemic
alternatives account erroneously yields that the agent does have a
choice.  And  thus  having  epistemic  alternatives  is  not  sufficient  in
order to have a choice.
Let us return to the Newcomb problem with an infallible predictor. I
have argued that the problem can be solved (or rather dissolved) by
pointing  out  that  the  choice  premise  and  the  infallible  predictor
premise are incompatible. This solution presupposes that alternatives
need to be open and up to the agent. This requirement is challenged
by  Pereboom’s  epistemic  account  which  defends  an  epistemic
criterion for alternatives. If Pereboom was right, we could no longer
simply dissolve Newcomb’s problem by arguing for the inconsistency
between  the  premises.  By  introducing  a  Two  Door  case  with  an
infallible predictor I suggest to reject Pereboom’s epistemic account.
The  rejection  of  this  account  represents  an  important  step  in  the
defense of my proposed solution that the premises of the Newcomb
problem with infallible predictor are inconsistent.  In order to further
motivate  this  solution,  the  next  section  suggests  rejecting
counterfactual accounts for alternatives.
135
The Phenomenology of Choice
7.5 Rejecting  the  standard  counterfactual
accounts for alternatives
One way to avoid the conflict between the premise that the predictor
is infallible and the premise that the agent has both the choice to take
only  the  second  box  or  both  boxes  is  to  defend  a  counterfactual
account for alternatives. We need to distinguish between two types of
counterfactual  accounts.  The  first  counterfactual  account  of
alternatives argues that if  the agent were to choose the alternative
which the being has not predicted, a small miracle would happen and
the participant would realize the alternative that makes the infallible
predictor  mistaken.  This is not  in conflict  with the infallibility of the
predictor  and  does  not  require  an  actual  miracle,  because  the
participant  will  not  choose this  option.  Let  us call  this the “miracle
account”.75 The  second  counterfactual  account  of  alternatives
defends a different resolution of the counterfactual. Let us call it the
“backtracking account”. It argues that if the participant were to choose
the alternative the being has not predicted, then the predictor would
have made a different prediction. That is, the past would have been
different  than  it  actually  is.  This  does  not  require  any  kind  of
backwards causation because the participant  does not  choose the
alternative which requires a different past.76
75 Famously, David Lewis has defended such an account in Lewis (1981).
76 David  Lewis  has  defended  in  Lewis  (1979)  the  possibility  of  such
backtracking resolution for unusual contexts: 
“Some special contexts favor a different  resolution of  vagueness, one
under which the past depends counterfactually on the present” (Lewis
(1979), p 456f as quoted in Horgan (1981), p. 334.) 
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I  reject both these counterfactual accounts for alternatives. Let me
start with the reason for my rejection of the backtracking account. In
order to motivate my rejection, let us return to the Two Door case with
an  infallible  predictor.  As  we  have  seen,  an  appropriate  notion  of
alternative should yield the result that an agent in such a situation has
no choice about which door to open. One door is locked and there is
nothing the participant can do to open the closed door. Definitions of
alternative that yield that the participant has a choice in this situation
should  thus  be  rejected.  One  account  with  such  a  result  is  the
backtracking account.  It  yields that  if  the participant  were to try to
open the locked door, she would succeed. The infallible being would
have  predicted  this  attempt  and  unlocked  the  door  and  thus  the
participant  does  have  the  choice  about  which  door  to  open.
Consequently,  I  reject  the backtracking account  of alternatives and
turn to the miracle account. 
According to the miracle account, the participant who would choose
to try to open the door which is locked would not succeed. A small
miracle would allow the participant to try to open the door, but the
door would remain locked77 and the participant would fail to open the
door. We thus get the correct result  that the agent in this situation
does not have a choice about which door to open. And so we might
have  an  account  of  alternatives  which  allows  us  to  consistently
defend all the premises for a Newcomb case with infallible predictor. 
There is however a famous objection to counterfactual accounts by
Horgan (1981) defends that the Newcomb case is such special context
for which the backtracking resolution is appropriate.  A defence of  the
backtracking resolution can be found in Bennett (1984).
77 If the door would open this would represent a bigger miracle. 
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Roderick  Chisholm.  In  his  paper  “Human  freedom  and  the  self”78
Chisholm argues that  counterfactual  analyses  of  claims  about  the
ability to do otherwise are bound to fail. He argues that the claim that
(a) 'he could have done otherwise' means no more than (b) 'if he had
chosen/tried/set out/decided/undertaken/willed to do otherwise, then
he would have done otherwise'  is false for the simple reason that (b)
can turn out  to be true for  cases where (a)  is  false.  The example
proposed by Chisholm is the following. (i) There is a murderer that
fires a shot. (ii) It is true that he could not have chosen otherwise than
he  did.  Chisholm  does  not  provide  a  specific  reason  (given  it  is
irrelevant – it is enough to accept that there is one), but let us assume
that he was psychologically incapable of choosing not to fire a shot.
(iii) If he could not have chosen otherwise than he did, then he could
not have refrained from firing the shot. From (ii) and (iii) we get (iv) he
could not have refrained from firing a shot. Further, it is true (v) that
he is a man such that had he chosen not to fire a shot, he would not
have fired a shot.  According to the counterfactual  analysis  we get
from (v) that he could have refrained from firing the shot. But this is in
direct contradiction with (iv). And thus, the counterfactual analysis is
mistaken.  And  so,  we  get  the  result  that  none  of  the  standard
counterfactual  accounts  for  alternatives  is  satisfactory  and  they
should be rejected.79
78 Chisholm (1964/1982).
79 Chisholm's  objection  is  still  accepted  by  contemporary  defenders  of
counterfactual  accounts about alternatives,  as can be seen in Garrett
Pendercraft's defense of local miracle compatibilism:
“[L]ocal  miracle  compatibilists  must  acknowledge that  there are some
cases in which the relevant counterlegal [i.e. local miracle counterfactual]
is true, and yet the corresponding can-claim is false (for example, cases
in which the can-claim involves an action that the agent obviously cannot
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Obviously, having argued that neither Pereboom’s epistemic account
nor  standard counterfactual  accounts  are  satisfactory accounts  for
alternatives does not show that it is impossible to defend a notion of
choice which is consistent with the infallibility of the predictor. Having
rejected standard counterfactual accounts of choice, I now sketch a
reductio based on Newcomb’s infallible predictor case to argue that a
(non-counterfactual)  notion  of  choice  which  is  consistent  with  the
infallibility of the predictor cannot be defended. 
7.6 Turning the argument on its head
What  are the consequences of  accepting both the choice premise
and the infallibility premise? Let us look at a situation in which the
being has predicted that the participant will take both boxes and has
thus put nothing in the second box. According to the choice premise,
the participant has, in this situation, the choice of taking both boxes or
do.)” Pendercraft (2010), p. 250.
He suggests that the local miracle compatibilist should not claim that the
conditional  analysis  is  both  the sufficient  and necessary condition for
can-claims. Rather, it is only a necessary condition which needs to be
combined with a second condition. He suggests the following analysis:
“(CA') S can do A just in case
(1) if S were to choose to do A, then she would do A, and
(2) there is no barrier to S's choosing to do A.” (Pendercraft (2010), p.
257)
However,  as  Pendercraft  also  acknowledges,  the  notion  of  barrier
(arguably) begs the question against a position which states that “some
action's  being  entailed  by the  past  and  the  laws is  a  “barrier”  to  an
agent's being able to refrain from that action.”  (Pendercraft  (2010), p.
257)
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only  the  second  box.  That  she  has  the  alternative  of  taking  both
boxes is unproblematic. If she takes both boxes, there is nothing in
the second box and the predictor has made a correct prediction. But
what  about  the  alternative  of  taking  only  the  second  box?  The
predictor has predicted that she will take both boxes and put nothing
in the second box. If she takes the second box, either the content of
the box does not correspond to the actual content of the box or the
being has made a mistake. The first possibility states that the content
would be different than it actually is. The second possibility states that
the predictor would be wrong which contradicts the premise that she
is infallible. In other words, we have to conclude that the assumption
that the participant has both the alternatives of taking the two boxes
or only the second box in this situation together with the assumption
that the being is infallible leads to a contradiction.80
Note that we do not have the same problem in the case of the weaker
inerrant predictor premise. The inerrant predictor premise only states
that the predictor has always been right, but allows for the possibility
that she could be mistaken. There is a contradiction in stating that an
infallible  being could  be mistaken,  but  there is  no contradiction  in
stating that an inerrant being could be mistaken.
80  As we have seen above, counterfactual accounts provide the means to
avoid this contradiction. According to the Lewisian account, the predictor
would  indeed  be  mistaken,  but  this  is  not  problematic  because  the
participant will not make this choice. And according to the backtracking
account,  there  is  no  contradiction,  because  although  the  past  would
need to be different than it actually is, the participant will not make this
choice. We have however seen reasons to reject these counterfactual
accounts.
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Based  on  the  reflections  in  the  above  sections,  I  come  to  the
conclusion  that  a  Newcomb  problem  with  infallible  predictor  has
inconsistent premises and that the question of what the participant
should do in such a situation can thus not be answered.
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8 Conclusion
8.1 Recapitulation
The  present  work  defends  the  view  that  rational  human  agents
experience  some alternatives  to  be  open  and  up  to  them.  These
experiences  can  be  veridical  only  if  determinism  were  false.  If
determinism  were  true,  these  experiences  turn  out  to  be
systematically illusory. 
The experience of an OU alternative has to be distinguished from the
experience an agent has in a situation where it seems to her that she
could act differently although it is evident to her how she is going to
act. I argue that both types of experiences warrant can-claims. The
latter  experience  warrants  the  claim  that  she  could  act  crazily
although it is evident to her that she will not do so. The reasons given
to her  are such that  she will  not  choose that  alternative (and she
believes this to be so). The former experience, the experience of OU
alternatives,  is  not  about  having crazy alternatives,  but  only about
alternatives  which  are  in  accordance  with  the  agent's  character,
preferences, and reasons given to her.81
I  argue  that  rational  human  agents  are  capable  of  distinguishing
between  these  two  types  of  alternatives  on  the  basis  of  their
experience (and beliefs  about  themselves).  The experience of  OU
81 Robert Kane has famously defended that this is the type of alternative
worth wanting. Cf. Kane (1996), chapter 7 'Plurality and Indeterminism'.
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alternatives grounds incompatibilist intuitions while the experience of
alternatives without OU alternatives explains compatibilist intuitions.
The latter experience is tied to the belief that something would have
had to be different in order for the agent to act differently. 
I consider it a strength of my view that it provides means to (at least
partially) explain these compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions on
the basis of our agentive experience. While I attempt to show that the
compatibilist  intuition  is  warranted,  I  argue  that  it  only  applies  to
certain cases of alternatives. Most notably it  does not apply to so-
called  “close-call”  decisions where both alternatives  seem similarly
attractive given the reasons available to the agent. But neither does it
apply  to  many  everyday  situations  where  several  alternatives  are
given to us in experience as open and up to us. 
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